̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge - Rob Doubleday

Cambridge initiative to address risks of future engineered pandemics

cjb250 — Thu, 27 Feb 2025 08:00:39 +0000

These are some of the questions being addressed by a new initiative launched today at the ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge, which seeks to address the urgent challenge of managing the risks of future engineered pandemics.

̽��ֱ��Engineered Pandemics Risk Management Programme aims to understand the social and biological factors that might drive an engineered pandemic and to make a major contribution to building the UK’s capability for managing these risks. It will build a network of experts from academia, government, and industry to tackle the problem.

Increased security threats from state and non-state actors, combined with increased urbanisation and global mobility, means the threat of deliberate pathogen release must be taken seriously as must other intertwined aspects of pandemic risk such as mis- and disinformation, the erosion of trust in a number of institutions and an increasingly volatile geopolitical context. Further potential risks are posed by recent developments in gene-editing tools and artificial intelligence, which have rapidly advanced technological capability that may make it easier to engineer potential pandemic pathogens.

Professor Clare Bryant from the Department of Medicine at the ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge said: “There is a great opportunity to take a joined-up approach to managing the risks posed by engineered pandemics. We need experts and agencies across the spectrum to work together to develop a better understanding of who or what might drive such events and what their likely impact would be. And we need evidence-informed policies and networks in place that would help us respond to – or better still, prevent – such an eventuality.”

̽��ֱ��aims of the Engineered Pandemics Risk Management Programme are:
To develop the conceptual underpinnings for the risk management of engineered pandemics based on interdisciplinary research
To support the capability of the UK’s engineered pandemic risk policy and practice, including building and maintaining networks that connect government, academia and industry.
To strengthen the international networks that will support this work globally

There are four main strands of work:

Social determinants of engineered pandemic threat

This strand will look at the actors who have the potential to engineer harmful pathogens, either deliberately or accidentally. It will ask questions such as: What could motivate bioterrorism in the coming decades? Who might the relevant actors be? What are the kinds of engineered pandemic that someone might want to create?

Dr Rob Doubleday, Executive Director of the Centre for Science and Policy at the ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge, said: “ ̽��ֱ��common narrative is that there’s a wide range of potential actors out there who want to create bioweapons but don’t yet have the technical means. But in fact, there’s been very little work to really understand who these people might be, and their relationship to emerging technology. To explore these questions, we need a broad network including social scientists, biosecurity researchers, criminologists, experts in geopolitics and counterterrorism.”

̽��ֱ��strand will also look at the governance of scientific research in areas that may facilitate an engineered pandemic, whether unwittingly or maliciously, aiming to deliver a policy framework that enables freedom of intellectual research while managing real and apparent risk in infectious disease research.

Professor Bryant said: “As scientists, we’re largely responsible for policing our own work and ensuring integrity, trustworthiness and transparency, and for considering the consequences of new knowledge and how it might be used. But with the rapid progress of genomic technologies and AI, self-regulation becomes more difficult to manage. We need to find governance frameworks that balance essential scientific progress with its potential misapplication.”

Biological determinants of engineered pandemic threat

Recognising that the most likely cause of an engineered pandemic would be the deliberate release of a naturally-occurring pathogen – viral or bacterial, for example – rather than a man-made pathogen, this strand aims to understand what might make a particular pathogen infectious and how our immune systems respond to infection. This knowledge will allow researchers to screen currently available drugs to prevent or treat infection and to design vaccines quickly should a pandemic occur.

Modelling threats and risk management of engineered pandemics

̽��ֱ��Covid-19 pandemic highlighted practical problems of dealing with pandemic infections, from the provision of personal protective equipment (PPE) to ensuring a sufficient supply of vaccine doses and availability of key medications. Modelling the potential requirements of a pandemic, how they could be delivered, how ventilation systems could be modiﬁed, what biosafety measures could be taken, for example, are all key challenges for managing any form of pandemic. This strand will address how existing modelling approaches would need to be adapted for a range of plausible engineered pandemics.

Policy innovation challenges

Working with the policy community, the Cambridge team will co-create research that directly addresses policy needs and involves policy makers. It will support policy makers in experimenting with more joined-up approaches through testing, learning and adapting solutions developed in partnership.

̽��ֱ��Engineered Pandemics Risk Management Programme is supported by a £5.25 million donation to the Centre for Research in the Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences (CRASSH) at the ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge. ̽��ֱ��team intends it to form a central component of a future Pandemic Risk Management Centre, for which it is now fundraising.

Professor Joanna Page, Director of CRASSH, said: “Cambridge has strengths across a broad range of disciplines – from genetics and immunology to mathematical modelling to existential risk and policy engagement – that can make a much-needed initiative such as this a success.”

To find out more, visit the Engineered Pandemic Risk Management website.

Covid-19 showed us how vulnerable the world is to pandemics – but what if the next pandemic were somehow engineered? How would the world respond – and could we stop it happening in the first place?

There is a great opportunity to take a joined-up approach to managing the risks posed by engineered pandemics

Clare Bryant

Martin Sanchez

Illustration showing global pandemic spread

̽��ֱ��text in this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. Images, including our videos, are Copyright © ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge and licensors/contributors as identified. All rights reserved. We make our image and video content available in a number of ways – on our main website under its Terms and conditions, and on a range of channels including social media that permit your use and sharing of our content under their respective Terms.

Yes

Licence type:

Public Domain

Economic growth and infrastructure resilience are key for Government’s new Chief Scientific Adviser

gm349 — Thu, 18 Apr 2013 14:53:05 +0000

̽��ֱ��Government’s new Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir Mark Walport, set out his priorities today at the Centre for Science and Policy’s annual conference - his first major public speech since taking office earlier this month. Sir Mark, who takes over the post from Sir John Beddington, was formerly Director of the Wellcome Trust.

Sir Mark highlighted five key themes for scientific advice in Government:

1. Ensuring that scientific knowledge translates to economic growth
2. Strengthening infrastructure resilience for the engineered world of transport, energy, the built environment and telecommunications and also the natural world
3. Underpinning policy with evidence
4. Harnessing science for emergencies
5. Providing advocacy and leadership for science

Taking the platform after just three weeks in the role, Sir Mark offered an insight into the kinds of challenges that he will be addressing. Citing the Science Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) advice during the Fukushima disaster, Sir Mark also highlighted the often understated role science has to play in diplomacy. Discussing calls for an EU moratorium on neonicotinoid insecticides to protect pollinators, including bees, Sir Mark highlighted the equivocal nature of the current evidence and balanced this with the need to assess the likely economic impact of withdrawing this class of pesticides. He called on the wider scientific community to collaboratively make the case for Government R&D funding (currently standing at £10 billion) by demonstrating the economic and societal impact of long-term research investment.

Sir Mark Walport said, " ̽��ֱ��challenges we face are significant and complex – from climate change to cyber-security, poverty to pandemics, food technologies to fracking. Difficult issues need to be viewed through multiple lenses, according to the nature of each specific challenge. Excellent advice on science, engineering, technology and social science is essential for the development and implementation of the best policy in Government. We need to break down barriers and silos by strengthening the linkages between industry, academia and government and using science for the benefit of society. Advice from the Government Office for Science can only be as good as the advice we receive and I am looking forward to working widely and collaboratively to pull in the best.”

Sir Bob Kerslake, Head of the Home Civil Service said, “Science in the Civil Service has a long and illustrious history. From the first Government Chief Scientist, Sir Solly Zuckerman, we have always valued the rigour and analysis that the profession brings to the formulation of evidence. ̽��ֱ��Civil Service Reform Plan focuses on improving our policymaking and science will play a central role through a combination of the best government knowledge with that of industry and academia.”

Deepening the understanding of how research and policy interrelate and building lasting, productive connections between academia and Whitehall is the primary focus of the Centre for Science and Policy (CSaP). Founded in 2009 at the ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge, the Centre also provides much needed professional development to researchers in the early stages of their careers, helping them understand the potential policy ramifications of their work and how best to communicate their research findings to policy makers.

In the last twelve months, CSaP has secured £1.1 million for its research and research-related activities from funding bodies including the ESRC, EPSRC and the European Commission Framework Programme. Over the past year, the total value of the research grants won, of which CSaP’s work forms a part, totalled over £10 million.

Professor Sir Leszek Borysiewicz, Vice Chancellor of the ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge said, “ ̽��ֱ��Centre for Science and Policy is an important initiative, facilitating access to the ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge’s world-leading expertise. ̽��ֱ��benefits of this deeper engagement are manifold: for the researchers who gain a greater understanding of real world challenges, for policy makers who gain access to the latest research findings, and for society which benefits from improved, evidence-based decision-making by government.”

Dr David Cleevely, Founding Director of the Centre for Science and Policy said, “At CSaP, we’ve seen concrete examples of how bringing together policy makers and academic experts has informed policy and legislation. We are investing in establishing these professional connections, and are also building a world-class research base aimed at deepening our understanding of how science and engineering advice gets incorporated into policy. In the past twelve months, CSaP has been part of research projects that have raised over £10 million in funding – an indication of the potential benefit to society of further improving knowledge exchange between government and academia.”

̽��ֱ��event today – entitled Future Directions for Scientific Advice in Whitehall - sees the Centre for Science and Policy bring together thought leaders from policy, industry and academia to discuss how government can make more effective use of the UK’s wealth of scientific advice, particularly in the context of the Government’s programme of Civil Service Reform.

A collection of essays entitled Future Directions for Scientific Advice in Whitehall will also be launched today to coincide with CSaP’s annual conference. Future Directions includes essays by Sir John Beddington (former Government Chief Scientific Adviser), Geoff Mulgan (Nesta), and Jill Rutter (Institute for Government) and was co-edited by Robert Doubleday, Executive Director of the Centre for Science and Policy, ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge and James Wilsdon, Professor of Science and Democracy at the ̽��ֱ�� of Sussex.

Future Directions for Scientific Advice in Whitehall is available for download at: http://www.csap.cam.ac.uk/events/future-directions-scientific-advice-whi...

̽��ֱ��Centre for Science and Policy’s second annual conference “Future directions for scientific advice in Whitehall” is sponsored by Royal Society of Chemistry, BAE Systems, BP, Lloyd’s, Thomson Reuters and Afton Chemical.

Sir Mark Walport set out his priorities today at the Centre for Science and Policy’s annual conference

Excellent advice on science, engineering, technology and social science is essential for the development and implementation of the best policy in Government.

Sir Mark Walport

Rajan Manickavasagam from Flickr

Westminster

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Licence. If you use this content on your site please link back to this page.

Yes