̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge - Trump

Brexit and Trump voters more likely to believe in conspiracy theories, survey study shows

fpjl2 — Fri, 23 Nov 2018 07:51:34 +0000

̽��ֱ��largest cross-national study ever conducted on conspiracy theories suggests that around a third of people in countries such as the UK and France think their governments are “hiding the truth” about immigration, and that voting for Brexit and Trump is associated with a wide range of conspiratorial beliefs – from science denial to takeover plots by Muslim migrants.

̽��ֱ��research, conducted as part of the ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge’s Conspiracy & Democracy project, and based on survey work from the YouGov-Cambridge centre, covers nine countries – US, Britain*, Poland, Italy, France, Germany, Portugal, Sweden, Hungary – and will be presented at a public launch in Cambridge on Friday 23 November.

According to project researcher Dr Hugo Leal, anti-immigration conspiracy theories have been “gaining ground” since the refugee crisis first came to prominence in 2015. “ ̽��ֱ��conspiratorial perception that governments are deliberately hiding the truth about levels of migration appears to be backed by a considerable portion of the population across much of Europe and the United States,” he said.

In Hungary, where controversial Prime Minister Viktor Orban is regularly accused of stoking anti-migrant sentiment, almost half of respondents (48%) believe their government is hiding the truth about immigration. Germany was the next highest (35%), with France (32%), Britain (30%) and Sweden (29%) also showing high percentages of this conspiracy among respondents, as well as a fifth (21%) of those in the United States.

Close to half of respondents who voted for Brexit (47%) and Trump (44%) believe their government is hiding the truth about immigration, compared with just 14% of Remain voters and 12% of Clinton voters.

̽��ֱ��researchers also set out to measure the extent of belief in a conspiracy theory known as ‘the great replacement’: the idea that Muslim immigration is part of a bigger plan to make Muslims the majority of a country’s population.

“Originally formulated in French far-right circles, the widespread belief in a supposedly outlandish nativist conspiracy theory known as the ‘great replacement’ is an important marker and predictor of the Trump and Brexit votes,” said Leal. Some 41% of Trump voters and 31% of Brexit voters subscribed to this theory, compared with 3% of Clinton voters and 6% of Remain voters.

Researchers also looked at a number of other popular conspiracy theories. Both Trump and Brexit voters were more likely to believe that climate change is a hoax, vaccines are harmful, and that a group of people “secretly control events and rule the world together”. “We found the existence of a conspiratorial worldview linking both electorates,” said Leal.

He describes the levels of science denial as an “alarming global trend”. In general, researchers found the idea that climate change is a hoax to be far more captivating for right-wing respondents, while scepticism about vaccines was less determined by “ideological affiliation”.

̽��ֱ��view that “the truth about the harmful effects of vaccines is being deliberately hidden from the public” ranged from lows of 10% in Britain to a startling quarter of the population – some 26% – in France.

̽��ֱ��conspiracy belief that a secret cabal “control events and rule the world together” varies significantly between European countries such as Portugal (42%) and Sweden (12%). Dr Hugo Drochon, also a researcher on the Leverhulme Trust-funded Conspiracy & Democracy project, suggests this has "public policy implications, because there are structural issues at play here too”.

“More unequal countries with a lower quality of democracy tend to display higher levels of belief in the world cabal, which suggests that conspiracy beliefs can also be addressed at a more ‘macro’ level,” said Drochon.

̽��ֱ��research team assessed the levels of “conspiracy scepticism” by looking at those who refuted every conspiratorial view in the study. Sweden had the healthiest levels of overall conspiracy scepticism, with 48% rejecting every conspiracy put to them. ̽��ֱ��UK also had a relatively strong 40% rejection of all conspiracies. Hungary had the lowest, with just 15% of people not taken in by any conspiracy theories.

Half of both Remain and Clinton voters were conspiracy sceptics, while 29% of Brexit voters and just 16% of Trump voters rejected all conspiracy theories.

̽��ֱ��question of trust, and which professions the public see as trustworthy, was also investigated by researchers. Government and big business came out worst across all countries included in the study. Roughly three-quarters of respondents in Italy, Portugal, Poland, Hungary and Britain say they distrusted government ministers and company CEOs. Distrust of journalists, trade unionists, senior officials of the EU, and religious leaders are also high in all surveyed countries.

Trust in academics, however, was still relatively high, standing at 57% in the US and 64% in Britain. “We hope these findings can provide incentive for academics to reclaim a more active role in the public sphere, particularly when it comes to illuminating the differences between verifiable truths and demonstrable falsehoods,” said Hugo Leal.

Apart from academics, only family and friends escape the general climate of distrust, with trust reaching levels between 80% and 90% in all countries. Leal argues that this might help explain the credibility assigned to “friend mediated” online social networks.

In all surveyed countries apart from Germany, about half the respondents got their news from social media, with Facebook the preferred platform followed by YouTube. Getting news from social media was less likely to be associated with complete scepticism of conspiracy theories – much less likely in countries such as the US and Italy.

Researchers found that consuming news from YouTube in particular was associated with the adoption of particular conspiratorial views, such as anti-vaccine beliefs in the US and climate change denial in Britain.

“A telling takeaway of the study is that conspiracy theories are, nowadays, mainstream rather than marginal beliefs,” said Leal. “These findings provide important clues to understanding the popularity of populist and nationalist parties contesting elections across much of the western world."

̽��ֱ��survey was conducted by YouGov during 13-23 August 2018, with a total sample size of 11,523 adults and results then weighted to be “representative of each market”.

* Northern Ireland was not included in the survey.

Latest research reveals the extent to which conspiracy theories have become “mainstream rather than marginal beliefs” across much of Europe and the US.

These findings provide important clues to understanding the popularity of populist and nationalist parties

Hugo Leal

Gage Skidmore

Donald Trump speaking at the 2014 Conservative Political Action Conference. Some 44% of Trump voters were found to believe their government is hiding the truth about immigration, according to researchers.

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'Populism' revealed as 2017 Word of the Year by Cambridge ̽��ֱ�� Press

sjr81 — Thu, 30 Nov 2017 14:02:21 +0000

Choosing a winner required looking at not only the most searched-for words but also spikes – occasions when a word is suddenly looked up many more times than usual on or around a particular date.

As Donald Trump, a polarizing candidate was being sworn in as the 45th president of the United States on January 22, 2017, searches for the word 'inauguration' on the online Cambridge Dictionary spiked. But so did searches for the word 'populism' because, on that same day, Pope Francis warned against a rising tide of populism in a widely reported interview with El Pais newspaper. In mid-March, after another high-profile interview with the pontiff – this time with the German newspaper Die Zeit – searches for populism spiked again.

Wendalyn Nichols, Publishing Manager at Cambridge ̽��ֱ�� Press, said: 'Spikes can reveal what is on our users’ minds and, in what’s been another eventful year, plenty of spikes can be directly connected to news items about politics in the US (nepotism, recuse, bigotry, megalomania) and the UK (shambles, untenable, extradite). ̽��ֱ��much-anticipated Taylor Review of working practices in the UK caused the term 'gig economy' to spike in July, and of course the spectacular solar eclipse is reflected in the spike for eclipse on 21 August.

'What sets populism apart from all these other words is that it represents a phenomenon that’s both truly local and truly global, as populations and their leaders across the world wrestle with issues of immigration and trade, resurgent nationalism, and economic discontent.'

Populism is described by the Cambridge Dictionary as ‘political ideas and activities that are intended to get the support of ordinary people by giving them what they want’. It includes the usage label ‘mainly disapproving’.

Populism has a taint of disapproval because the -ism ending often indicates a philosophy or ideology that is being approached either uncritically (liberalism, conservatism, jingoism) or cynically (tokenism).

Evidence from the Cambridge English Corpus – a 1.5-billion-word database of language – reveals that people tend to use the term populism when they think it’s a political ploy instead of genuine. Both aspects of -ism are evident in the use of populism in 2017: the implied lack of critical thinking on the part of the populace, and the implied cynicism on the part of the leaders who exploit it.

̽��ֱ��word 'populism' has been announced as the Cambridge Dictionary 2017 Word of the Year.

What sets populism apart from all these other words is that it represents a phenomenon that’s both truly local and truly global, as populations and their leaders across the world wrestle with issues of immigration and trade, resurgent nationalism, and economic discontent.

Wendalyn Nichols

̽��ֱ��White House (official Flickr)

President Donald J. Trump delivers remarks at Yokota Air Base | November 5, 2017 (Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead)

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One Hundred Days of Trump

ag236 — Fri, 28 Apr 2017 15:30:44 +0000

̽��ֱ��concept of the Hundred Days was first used to describe the period between Napoleon’s return from exile and his final defeat at Waterloo, in 1815. As a marker of the president’s first months in office, a “honeymoon” period when conditions for him to enact much of his agenda are supposed to be most advantageous, it has come to take on a rather different meaning in modern American politics.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was in the Oval Office from 1933 to 1945, was the first president to have a period known as “ ̽��ֱ��Hundred Days.” He used it to usher in a series of legislative reforms that began the implementation of the New Deal, a domestic reform program which totally refashioned America in FDR’s image and made his party, the Democrats, the dominant political force in the country for decades to follow.

In American politics, the Hundred Days are meant to be a period of Rooseveltian success, not Napoleonic failure. It is supposed to mark a period of dramatic change so that America comes to reflect the values and goals of its new president. It is not supposed to end in the president’s own Waterloo. Every president wants to be a Roosevelt, not a Napoleon.

Roosevelt’s Hundred Days have become the stuff of legend, and books on the period—including a smart, superbly written account by a noted Cambridge expert of American history, Professor Tony Badger—incorporate the phrase in their title. This is because the Hundred Days had more of a Napoleonic spirit than FDR himself would have liked to admit, conveying a gut-level instinct for action, ambition, and above all grandeur. ̽��ֱ��Hundred Days are supposed to be consequential, a period in which people realize they are living through an important part of history. They are supposed to be a reach for glory.

With the advent of the New Deal, FDR made good on this promise of a dynamic Hundred Days. Roosevelt worked with Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress to pass legislation on a wide number of problems caused by the Great Depression, from the banking crisis to widespread poverty and unemployment to the collapse of agriculture and industry. Within three months, many of the staples of the New Deal were set up. Not all would last, but Roosevelt and congressional Democrats showed that they had a plan and were doing what they could to enact it, quickly.

Few historians accept that the New Deal cured the Depression—the largest government stimulus program in world history, also known as the Second World War, did that instead. Nor did FDR have a coherent ideological vision: he was too experimental and pragmatic for that.

But by showing that he cared, and that he was willing to do whatever it took to help the American people in their time of suffering, he transformed himself into the most popular president in American history. After Roosevelt’s first victory in 1932, Democrats won six of the next eight presidential elections and controlled both houses of Congress for all but four of the next forty-eight years.

̽��ֱ��Hundred Days started something pretty special. It’s no surprise, then, that presidents from both parties who followed in Roosevelt’s wake have sought their own dynamic start. Most haven’t been successful, and many have seen their presidencies nearly ruined from disasters right at the outset.

John F. Kennedy oversaw the humiliating debacle at the Bay of Pigs on April 17, 1961, his 94th day in office, while Ronald Reagan was shot and nearly killed on March 30, 1981, his 69th day. Neither tragedy did much damage to presidents regarded, at the time and ever since, as popular and successful. On the other hand, the president who self-consciously strived hardest to emulate FDR’s rapid achievements, Lyndon B. Johnson, saw the early hopes of his presidency destroyed by the war in Vietnam and the deterioration of race relations at home.

In other words, the Hundred Days marker is a poor gauge of presidential success. Roosevelt set an example of a quick-start, dynamically successful presidency, yet it remains pretty much the only example. President Donald Trump, who, despite Republican majorities in Congress, has accomplished virtually nothing of his agenda so far, may have had a good point when he recently tweeted to complain about being held to “the ridiculous standard of the first 100 days.”

̽��ֱ��problem is, it was Trump himself who set that standard. All through the presidential campaign last year, and then during the transitional period between the election in November and the inauguration in January, Trump not only promised quick action but quick results. ̽��ֱ��wall along the border with Mexico, supposedly adverse trade deals, ISIS—all were going to be solved “immediately” or “on day one.” At a campaign rally in Florida, in October, he said he would begin to repeal and replace Obamacare on his “first day in office. … It’s going to be so easy.”

It hasn’t been so easy, of course, certainly not for President Trump. Only time will tell whether that means his presidency will ultimately end with him as a Roosevelt or a Napoleon. But he’s not off to a good start.

Andrew Preston, Professor of American History, is the author of Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy (Knopf, 2012)

Professor Andrew Preston examines the origins of the first hundred days as a measure of presidential success in American politics.

In American politics, the Hundred Days are meant to be a period of Rooseveltian success, not Napoleonic failure.

Andrew Preston

Andrew Preston on Trump's 100 days

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#ICYMI - Trump’s First Hundred Days

ag236 — Fri, 28 Apr 2017 14:41:16 +0000

“I don't think that there is a presidential period of time in the first 100 days where anyone has done nearly what we've been able to do.” So declared President Donald J. Trump in a recent interview, offering a characteristically bold interpretation of American history.

Since his inauguration on 20 January, Trump has certainly been active. On the international scene, he has played nice with Vladimir Putin, fallen out with Vladimir Putin, bombed Syria, and sent the US Navy to rattle North Korea. He’s wined and dined the Chinese president, overcome his germaphobia long enough to hold hands with British Prime Minister Theresa May (while refusing to shake German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s), and variously attacked and embraced NATO.

At home, he has struck a defiant tone – against the media, Meryl Streep, assorted nay-sayers, and his own intelligence agencies. He has played musical chairs with his advisors in the West Wing, and accused his predecessor of wiretapping him. Amid the sturm und drang he has managed to get a Supreme Court nominee approved, but his much-vaunted healthcare proposal was dramatically shelved when support failed to materialize, and his travel bans targeting Muslims have been suspended by the courts.

Perhaps his rollback of Obama-era environmental protections amounts to the biggest formal change thus far, but as a new executive order undoing older ones, it required only the stroke of a pen. He signed another order withdrawing the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, but NAFTA still stands. And there are not, as yet, any bricks in the border wall. In sum, in substantive terms, Trump’s administration has not done nearly as much as he claims, or promised.

̽��ֱ��idea of the “First 100 days” as a benchmark of presidential success dates back to the early months of Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency in 1933. And Roosevelt, as with much in presidential history, set the bar high. Amid the grave crisis of the Great Depression, and with a landslide electoral victory just behind him, Roosevelt promised “direct, vigorous action” to meet the economic emergency – and delivered.

With a potent combination of charisma aided by circumstance, he persuaded Congress (sitting in a special session lasting 100 days) to pass fifteen major pieces of legislation – restructuring major industries, regulating banking and finance, providing subsidies to farmers, and offering some relief to the unemployed and destitute. He explained these actions in “Fireside Chats” – using the new technology of radio to speak directly to citizens in their own homes, connecting president and populace in a new way. His plain speech and folksy manner served to revolutionise presidential rhetoric, and in the most laudatory accounts, transform the mood of the country too. From despair came determination and a new positive outlook, courtesy of Roosevelt’s winning personality and can-do attitude (never mind that the Depression itself didn’t lift for a decade).

No other president can match Roosevelt’s speedy legislative achievements, or the mythical aura that has grown up around his presidency. Most presidents rack up a success or two: Bill Clinton got his budget through in the first 100 days, Barack Obama signed the $800 billion stimulus into law, and George W. Bush’s tax relief plan was on its way to approval. But their most significant legislative accomplishments came later.

Even for Presidents who have gained their own mythic status, the First 100 Days weren’t always easy. John F. Kennedy’s start was marred by the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961. Ronald Reagan faced, and survived, an assassination attempt in March 1981. Reagan’s demeanour in adversity, though (he quipped that he hoped all his doctors were Republicans), sent his approval ratings sky high – helping him pass a major economic recovery programme, and laying the foundation for his later tax and budget cuts.

Trump has presented outlines of his budget and proposed tax reforms, but Congress still needs to take action. House of Representatives Speaker Paul Ryan has twice pulled votes on healthcare reform, and Trump is yet to affix his signature to a major law.

And then there’s that FBI investigation into the Trump campaign’s ties to Russia, lurking in the background but threatening to upend his administration altogether. With all thatin mind, Trump’s claims of extraordinary action and achievement undoubtedly fall short. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, Trump has responded to a spate of negative “100 days” assessments by turning on a dime, and now pronouncing this benchmark to be “an artificial barrier” that isn’t “very meaningful.”

Of course, all politicians over-promise and under-deliver, but for a president who defined himself in opposition to typical politicians, this is a dangerous game. His job approval rating in the Gallup poll stands at 41% on average for the first quarter of 2017 – the lowest accorded a new President since polling began, and the first below 50%. And yet, a recent Washington Post/ABC News poll suggests that Trump voters aren’t displaying any “buyer’s remorse.”

For now, his supporters are still willing to give Trump the benefit of the doubt. In this, the pragmatic side of Trump’s political persona may be working to his advantage – his claims to be a “dealmaker” providing some cover when backing away from his more strident stances. But his deals need to bear fruit, and soon.

In mid-April, the White House Instagram account captioned an image “#ICYMI President Donald J. Trump is continuing to Make America Great Again!” “ICYMI” – text-speak for “In Case You Missed It” – was apt. For all the bombast, any return to “greatness” as Trump sees it, has indeed been easy to miss. ̽��ֱ��mood of the country has not been transformed (Trump’s Twitter musings have not proven to be the new “Fireside Chat”).

̽��ֱ��United States remains a deeply polarized nation, where politics has become an ever-sharper scythe, defining and dividing friendships, families, communities and regions. Yet the sky has not fallen. American political and civic institutions have not collapsed, as some darkly predicted in November. Outrage has fuelled and followed him, the spectre of impeachment hovers over him, but as his first 100 days draws to a close, Trump may yet have a more successful second act. At the very least, it is unlikely to be dull.

Dr. Emily Charnock is a Lecturer in American History and a Fellow of Selwyn College

Dr Emily Charnock, Lecturer in American History, delivers her verdict as the Trump presidency reaches its first major milestone.

̽��ֱ��idea of the 'First 100 days' as a benchmark of presidential success dates back to the early months of Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency in 1933. Roosevelt, as with much in presidential history, set the bar high.

Emily Charnock

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First Brexit and now Trump: what is populism and how might we view it?

amb206 — Tue, 24 Jan 2017 08:00:00 +0000

As convenient shorthand for a brand of politics that has stolen the headlines, ‘populism’ has been used by academics and journalists to describe a host of movements and their leaders at different times and in different parts of the world that appear, at first glance, to have little in common.

Despite its wide usage in politics, the term remains ill-defined. This is partly because populism is chameleon-like; it changes its appearance depending on what (or whom) it is attached to.

Most notably, populism has been attributed to right-wing groups and leaders. Top of the list is US President Donald Trump, who has proposed draconian measures to deter illegal immigrants.

In recent years, however, the term has also been associated with left-wing movements such as Podemos, a Spanish party that wants to introduce voting rights for foreign residents.

While the term ‘populism’ has become a buzzword, it is certainly not a new phenomenon. ̽��ֱ��populist label was attached to a late-19th century radical peasant movement in the USA that sought to reform the political system and gave rise to the American People’s Party.

It has also been used to describe the Narodnik movement formed by a small group of urban elites in 19th-century Russia in a (failed) attempt to incite a peasant revolt.

Moving forward to the mid-20th century, the term ‘populism’ was used to characterise a new form of political mobilisation in Latin America that emerged with charismatic leaders such as Getúlio Vargas in Brazil and Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina.

In Western Europe, populism was a relatively rare phenomenon until the end of the 20th century, when it was associated with the emergence of a new wave of nationalist, right-wing parties with an anti-immigration agenda.

Because the term is often equated with demagogy or political opportunism, populism generally carries a negative connotation. Indeed, it has become a label to denigrate a political opponent. ̽��ֱ��pejorative, vague and widespread use of the term in the public sphere is perhaps unsurprising given the lack of a definitional consensus in the academic literature.

Scholars have sought to characterise populism as a strategy, a movement, a doctrine, a political style and rhetoric. What unites most (if not all) definitions of populism is the emphasis it places on the centrality of ‘the people’.

In 2004, the Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde generated a definition that has become highly influential. Mudde conceptualises populism as a ‘thin’ ideology (one that lacks a programmatic core) that is based on the symbolic division of society into two antagonistic groups: ‘the virtuous people’ (who play the role of the underdog) and ‘the evil elite’.

Populism rarely exists in isolation; indeed, it usually attaches itself to more refined (‘thick’) host-ideologies (eg socialism on the left, and nationalism on the right).

In recent years, Europe has witnessed the rise of populist parties at both ends of the political spectrum. Since the onset of the refugee crisis, right-wing populist groupings have been gaining momentum.

Scholars have come up with countless theories to help explain the success of these groups. One way to make sense of the expanding literature is to differentiate between demand- and supply-side explanations.

Demand-side explanations emphasise the factors that help create a breeding ground for right-wing populist parties to thrive. Classical demand-side explanations include so-called ‘grievance theories’, which hypothesise that broad changes in the international environment, such as immigration and globalisation, can generate insecurity and dissatisfaction with mainstream (consensus) politics.

An environment of discontent generates fertile soil for right-wing populists, as they present themselves as a refreshing alternative to ‘mainstream’ parties (ie traditional party families in Europe, such as Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and Liberals).

While demand-side factors appear necessary for the rise of right-wing populist parties, they do not guarantee electoral success. ̽��ֱ��supply side, therefore, looks at how such parties harness this demand.

Supply-side explanations may include factors like the media landscape, party organisation and leadership, as well as so-called political opportunity structures (institutional arrangements such as the electoral system). For instance, proportional representation (PR) electoral systems generally entail a lower risk of ‘wasted votes’ (votes that do not help elect a candidate), which makes it easier for emerging (smaller) parties (eg populist parties) to access power.

Against the backdrop of the Brexit vote and the ascent of Donald Trump in the USA, the fear of a renewed swing to the right in European politics looms large in public discourse. In his State of the Union address in September 2016, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, spoke about the dangers of the unprecedented rise of ‘galloping populism’. His statement echoed earlier warnings by European leaders about the rise of populism in response to European crises.

These warnings were not entirely unfounded. In October 2015, the Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei or SVP) scored a record high by securing nearly 30% of the votes in the Swiss federal elections. In December 2015, Marine Le Pen’s Front National (FN) won the first round of French regional elections. ̽��ֱ��following year, the German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) reached double-digit percentages in their first appearance in German state parliamentary elections in several Bundesländer.

With the Brexit vote in the UK and the election of Donald Trump in the USA, 2016 will inevitably be remembered as the year of the populist revolt. This trend may continue in 2017, with important elections coming up in the Netherlands, France and Germany.

In the face of these developments, it is important to put the rise of the populist right into a broader perspective. While support for right-wing populist parties has increased in many countries, these parties still have limited access to power. In fact, there is wide variation in the electoral performances of such parties across Western Europe.

While right-wing populist parties have formed part of (or provided parliamentary support for) national governments in some countries, including Austria, Denmark, Switzerland and the Netherlands, they have been virtually non-existent or unsuccessful in others, such as Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Luxembourg.

̽��ֱ��disparity between Western European countries raises questions about the variation in the electoral fortunes of right-wing populist parties in Europe. Specifically, why do right-wing populist parties emerge and succeed in rallying support in some countries but fail to do so in others?

Amid the media frenzy, we tend to forget about these ‘negative cases’. Heeding Sherlock Holmes’s advice to pay attention to ‘the dog that didn’t bark’, it makes sense to study the puzzling absence of right-wing populist parties in some polities.

As academics, we must continue to strive for a deeper understanding of this phenomenon. Populism is not a disease; it is a symptom of a democratic system that is ailing. There is nothing inherently undemocratic about populism. In small doses, it can act as a political corrective: it can flag up discontent and serve as an antidote to voter fatigue.

If we want to counteract the populist tide, we should start addressing the causes, not the symptoms. We must first tone down our anti-populist rhetoric and find creative ways to revamp our political system. Defaming those who vote for populists will do nothing but provide ammunition to further their cause.

Léonie de Jonge will be giving a talk on ‘Right-Wing Populists in Power and Periphery’ at Pembroke College (Nihon Room, Foundress Court) at 6.30-7.15pm on 26 January 2017. All welcome.

In an article that draws on her research into populism in Western Europe, Léonie de Jonge (PhD candidate in the Department of Politics and International Studies) urges a measured approach to movements often viewed as threatening. De Jonge is giving a talk at Pembroke College on 26 January 2017.

Populism is not a disease; it is a symptom of a democratic system that is ailing. There is nothing inherently undemocratic about populism. In small doses, it can act as a political corrective.

Léonie de Jonge

Dr Case (Flickr Creative Commons)

Populism

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