̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge - EU Referendum

Opinion: Why policymakers should care about location

Anonymous — Fri, 08 Mar 2019 09:00:58 +0000

̽��ֱ��EU Referendum of June 2016 shone a light upon some of the deep fault lines contained within British society, throwing up profound and uncomfortable questions about what underpinned the differences in people’s perspectives that were revealed in the vote. Evidence suggests that you were much more likely to have voted to Leave if you had not been to university, were over the age of 45 and lived in a town or the countryside rather than a city.

This seismic event, along with the other political earthquakes currently shaking democratic politics throughout the Western world, reveals societies that are profoundly divergent in terms of political values and cultural outlook. Life chances are often contingent on where you are born, where you grow up and what access you have to educational opportunity. ‘Place’, in other words, has a profound influence on our sense of where we belong and the values we prefer.

For politicians and policymakers who came of age during years of sustained economic growth, and who assumed the financially driven economy would generate opportunities for all, these deeply structural patterns of inequality must come as a shock. Anger and frustration underpinned the revolts by the disenchanted against democracy’s political establishments, sentiments which powered new waves of popular protest and support for populist challenger parties.

These responses highlight the inadequacies of a policy paradigm rooted in assumptions about stable economic growth, the unalloyed merits of urban expansion, and the capacity and political will of states to redistribute public goods across poorer regions.

Government is not alone in bearing responsibility for these issues. Academic experts could also have done more to highlight the major inequalities that are opening up across our democratic lives. These inequalities have helped fuel the very different responses to Brexit that have been apparent in our own ‘place’.

̽��ֱ��city of Cambridge was very clearly in favour of Remain in the Referendum – with 73.8% voting in favour. But drive for 30 minutes in almost any direction from the centre and you will find yourself in villages or towns that voted overwhelmingly for Leave. They may be geographically close, but, in relation to Brexit, a chasm of outlook and experience divides Cambridge from the places around it.

A new Combined Authority now links Cambridge, Cambridgeshire and Peterborough – one of a number of innovations in administrative devolution introduced in England in recent years. This single jurisdiction has a limited set of powers conferred upon its elected Mayor. These new arrangements have had the effect of formally linking Cambridge and its world-class university to districts and towns from which it is, in many ways, a world away. This has created a kind of natural experiment on our doorstep, a smaller-scale replica of some of the geographical divides that are apparent across the country. Some of the social inequalities that exist in the eastern region are ingrained – and are one reason why this area lacks a sense of shared geographical identity. Divides of this sort will require both political will and policy ingenuity to solve.

If we compare Cambridge and Peterborough, for instance, the latter’s inhabitants have a significantly lower standard of living, on average, than their counterparts in Cambridge. On a range of public health measures, from obesity to physical activity levels and avoidable mortalities, there is an entrenched difference between these towns.

More of Peterborough’s children receive free school meals, and a much lower proportion of its residents have access to further and higher education. Most Cambridge full-time residents can expect to earn £120 more per week than their Peterborough equivalent; and the latter’s inhabitants can expect, on average, to live two years fewer than their Cambridge counterparts.

There are significant disparities within each of these places, as well as between them. In 2018, for instance, the think tank Centre for Cities ranked Cambridge the most unequal city in the UK – for the second year in a row – which should give us pause for thought. Cambridge is home to an extraordinary concentration of academic expertise, innovation and knowledge-intensive industries. How can the economic and societal benefits of these assets be more evenly distributed?

̽��ֱ�� ̽��ֱ�� has a key role to play in addressing these issues. At Cambridge’s newly established Bennett Institute for Public Policy, we are committed to a deeper understanding of them, and to helping policymakers think through different potential responses.

For instance, we are currently examining some of the main differences in economic opportunity and social provision that characterise life in different kinds of town within England, looking at whether the ‘footprint’ of public services is receding more dramatically in, for instance, post-industrial towns than elsewhere. And we are exploring ways in which the newly created tier of Combined Authorities, including that in Cambridgeshire and Peterborough, can improve in terms of their political accountability to their citizens.

Cambridge is, in relative terms, one of the wealthiest parts of the country. ̽��ֱ��city is one of the strongest sources of economic growth in the UK, and a provider of employment for many residents from Cambridgeshire – though relatively few from Fenland or Peterborough. ̽��ֱ��most widely aired solution to the region’s imbalances is to do more to improve its connectivity to the areas that lie beyond its boundaries. To get to the root of the economic disparity in the Cambridgeshire and Peterborough region, we need to understand the underlying factors that make ‘place’ so important both to the innovation industries that have flourished in Cambridge and to the other kinds of business – notably agriculture – in the landscape that surrounds it.

̽��ֱ�� ̽��ֱ�� houses a range of individuals and groups with considerable academic expertise on the social and policy issues facing the region, and the importance of place. Several of these have made important contributions to policy debates, for instance as advisors to, and members of, the Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Independent Economic Review, the Greater Cambridge Partnership and the Combined Authority’s Business Board.

Understanding the importance of place to public policy does not just mean thinking locally, however. There are many different kinds of community – institutional, cultural, or voluntary – which matter to people, and also to policymakers, and some of these extend beyond national borders while others reside within them. In policy circles, the notion of place is a more recent discovery in the wake of events like Brexit. Our conclusion is that bringing intellectual depth and a richer evidence base to this emergent issue is one of the major contributions which the ̽��ֱ�� can make to public policy in our region.

By Ben Goodair, a Research Assistant at the Bennett Institute for Public Policy, and Professor Michael Kenny, the Institute's inaugural Director.

What account should policymaking take of the notion of 'place' – the landscapes, cities and towns we inhabit, with all the opportunities and challenges they bring? Ben Goodair and Michael Kenny from Cambridge’s newly established Bennett Institute for Public Policy explore the question in light of the different responses to the EU Referendum in the eastern region.

Some of the social inequalities that exist in the eastern region are ingrained – and are one reason why this area lacks a sense of shared geographical identity. Divides of this sort will require both political will and policy ingenuity to solve

Ben Goodair and Michael Kenny

̽��ֱ��District

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‘Cognitive flexibility’ associated with voting attitudes in EU Referendum, study finds

fpjl2 — Mon, 16 Apr 2018 19:01:53 +0000

A new study suggests that the way our brains process everyday information helps to shape our ideological beliefs and political decision-making – including attitudes towards the UK’s 2016 EU Referendum.

Scientists from the ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge combined objective cognitive tests with questionnaires designed to gauge social and political attitudes in a sample of over 300 UK citizens, to investigate the psychological underpinnings of nationalistic attitudes.

̽��ֱ��study examined differences in “cold cognition”: emotionally-neutral decision making based on attention and recall (as opposed to “hot cognition”, which is influenced by emotion).

Researchers measured the extent to which an individual displays a more “flexible” or more “persistent” cognitive style. Cognitive flexibility is characterised by adapting with greater ease to change, while cognitive persistence reflects a preference for stability through adherence to more defined information categories.

̽��ֱ��findings demonstrate that those who displayed higher cognitive flexibility were less likely to support authoritarian and nationalistic ideological stances. They were also more likely to support remaining in the EU as well as immigration and free movement of labour. Cognitive persistence was associated with more conservative and nationalistic attitudes, which in turn predicted support for leaving the EU.

̽��ֱ��research was conducted by scientists from the ̽��ֱ��’s Department of Psychology and is published today in the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

“Voting is often thought to be an emotional decision. People describe ‘voting with their heart’ or having a gut reaction to particular politicians,” said Leor Zmigrod, lead researcher and Gates Cambridge Scholar.

“While emotion is clearly integral to political decision-making, our research suggests that non-emotional cognitive information processing styles, such as adaptability to change, also play a key role in shaping ideological behavior and identity.”

“By connecting the realm of cognition with that of ideology, we find that flexibility of thought may have far-reaching consequences for social and political attitudes,” she said.

All the study’s 332 participants were cognitively healthy adults who completed two classic evaluations of cognitive flexibility: a card-sorting task involving shifting categorisation by shape and colour, and a neutral word association task.

Participants also consented to providing responses to standardized questions on topics such as attitudes towards immigration and citizenship, and personal attachment to the UK. All data were anonymised and controlled for a number of factors including age and education.

With her Cambridge colleagues Dr Jason Rentfrow and Prof Trevor Robbins, Zmigrod constructed rigorous statistical models that revealed a tendency towards cognitive flexibility in the tests predicted ideological orientations that were less authoritarian, nationalistic, and conservative. This in turn predicted reduced support for Brexit.

“Our findings suggest that persistent adherence to a set of rules in a basic card-sorting game is associated with support for traditional social values and conservative political attitudes,” said Rentfrow.

̽��ֱ��researchers also found that participants who reported greater reliance on routines and traditions in their daily lives, and who strongly favored certainty over uncertainty, were more likely to prefer the traditionalism and perceived stability offered by nationalistic, authoritarian, and conservative ideologies. Increased dependence on daily routines was also related to greater support for Brexit and immigration control.

Participants were asked about their agreement with post-Referendum political attitudes. Those who supported the statement “a citizen of the world is a citizen of nowhere” and opposed the statement “the Government has a right to remain in the EU if the costs are too high” exhibited a tendency towards cognitive persistence.

“ ̽��ֱ��results suggest that psychological preferences for stability and consistency may translate into attitudes that favour uniformity and a more defined national identity,” said Zmigrod.

̽��ֱ��researchers point out that the sample size is limited, and the correlations – while strong – are on general trends in the data. “Ideologies such as nationalism are highly complex constructs, and there are many reasons people believe what they do and vote the way they do,” added Zmigrod.

“In today’s politically-polarised climate, it is important to understand more about the psychological processes behind nationalistic and social attitudes if we are to build bridges between communities.”

Latest research combining social and political surveys with objective cognitive testing suggests that “cognitive flexibility” contributes to formation of ideology. ̽��ֱ��study finds correlations between cognitive thinking styles and support for Brexit.

By connecting the realm of cognition with that of ideology, we find that flexibility of thought may have far-reaching consequences for social and political attitudes

Leor Zmigrod

Megan Trace

Brexit March

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Opinion: Parliament and Brexit

fpjl2 — Fri, 30 Jun 2017 12:43:57 +0000

Demands to reclaim sovereignty were an important part of the UK’s decision to leave the European Union. “Take back control of our laws”, the Leave campaigners exhorted the British electorate in 2016.

̽��ֱ��expectation was that Parliament would be a major beneficiary. After all, the so-called democratic deficit in EU politics has long been synonymous with a diminution of the powers of national legislatures. Parliament, it was supposed, would play a key role in the process of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, and in the legislative arrangements required to ensure it would take place with minimal disruption to the UK.

It quickly became clear that the Prime Minister’s view was rather different. Parliament appeared to be an irritant to the executive’s attempts to pursue its version of Brexit. Having lost the initial attempt to trigger Article 50 without Parliamentary engagement thanks to the legal case brought by Gina Miller and others, Theresa May appeared to think that any attempts to amend or improve the draft legislation was an assault on her intention of making a success of Brexit. Calls for unilateral offers on the rights of EU nationals, or to stay in the single market, were given short shrift.

Not content with securing the EU Withdrawal Act without amendments, the Prime Minister called a snap general election in the hope of strengthening her parliamentary majority and undermining what she seemed to perceive as twin dangers: the nine Liberal Democrats MPs, and the “unelected” House of Lords, where pro-European voices remained rather louder than in the Commons.

Paradoxically, her catastrophic gamble resulted in a hung parliament that has weakened the Prime Minister’s hand. It has also created the conditions for greater cross-party working, for a less clear-cut withdrawal, and for increased leverage for Parliament.

Prior to the election, the PM could rely on the Salisbury Convention to ensure that Labour would ultimately not defy the will of the Commons or the Government’s 2015 manifesto pledge to hold a referendum and be bound by the results of the referendum. ̽��ֱ��outcome of the 2017 General Election ensures that the Opposition could reasonably claim that the Government does not have a majority and, hence, needs to adopt a more consensual approach to withdrawal.

What role is there, then, for Parliament?

̽��ֱ��Queen’s Speech was dominated by Brexit, in a way that the General Election was not. Eight pieces of legislation were flagged up. Among them was the all-encompassing “Repeal Bill” (now demoted from the “Great Repeal Bill” originally proposed) required to repeal the 1972 European Communities Act, to enshrine EU law into UK law, and to ensure there are no gaps in the Statute Book on the day the UK leaves the EU. Alongside it were other bills on trade, customs, immigration, agriculture, fisheries and nuclear safeguards. For each of these pieces of legislation the Government will need to secure a majority in both Houses. What are its chances of doing so?

̽��ֱ��confidence and supply deal with the DUP includes Brexit-related matters. ̽��ֱ��results of the first vote on the Queen’s Speech, with a Government majority of 14, show that the Government can get business through the Commons. Whether it will do so well on more contentious matters where just a handful of Tory rebels could alter the outcome is an open question – fascinating for academics, a nightmare for Government whips.

̽��ֱ��first post-election vote in the Lords saw a clear government majority to reject an amendment on remaining in the single market and customs union. That vote, however, is not a good indicator of what may follow. ̽��ֱ��amendment was not supported by the Labour frontbench, so although it was proposed by Labour peer Lord Adonis, and secured some rebel Labour support, it fell far short of the numbers that would come about if Labour put a whip on.

̽��ֱ��experience of the 2015-17 Parliament was very clear: where Labour and the Liberal Democrats work together, with some crossbench support, they can defeat the Government. Votes in the Commons will be tight throughout the coming session. Votes in the Lords, meanwhile, may swing wildly according to whether the largest opposition party wishes to let the Government set the Brexit agenda, or prefers to cooperate with other parties (and rebel Tories) to shape Brexit.

̽��ֱ��general election result increases leverage for Parliament when it comes to Brexit. Here, Baroness Smith of Newnham, a lecturer in the Department of POLIS, reflects on recent turmoil and the tightening of Commons votes as Brexit edges closer.

For each of these pieces of legislation the Government will need to secure a majority in both Houses. What are its chances of doing so?

Julie Smith

UK Parliament/Jessica Taylor

Theresa May at PMQs

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Opinion: Remainer or re-leaver? ̽��ֱ��philosophical conundrum posed by Brexit

fpjl2 — Wed, 07 Jun 2017 11:07:43 +0000

If you only glanced at a recent YouGov survey, you might think that a large majority of the UK is in agreement about Brexit. ̽��ֱ��electorate may have divided pretty evenly in the referendum, but now the 45% of “hard leavers” are joined by 23% who “voted to remain but still think the government has a duty to bring the UK out of the EU”.

One reading of this poll is that the country is now uniting behind Brexit. As YouGov headlined its report: “Forget 52%. ̽��ֱ��rise of the ‘re-leavers’ mean the pro-Brexit electorate is 68%.”

But to conclude that the country is uniting would be shallow, and for prime minister Theresa May, at least, dangerous.

Most people now accept Brexit, but that doesn’t mean they believe in it. Re-leavers are addressing a genuine philosophical problem: should you change your beliefs when you find yourself in the minority?

Jean-Jacques Rousseau once wrote:

When a law is proposed in the people’s assembly, what is asked of them is not precisely whether they approve or reject, but whether or not it conforms to the general will that is theirs. Each man [sic], in giving his vote, states his opinion on this matter, and the declaration of the general will is drawn from the counting of votes. When, therefore, the opinion contrary to mine prevails, this proves merely that I was in error, and that what I took to be the general will was not so.

Put to one side the fact that Rousseau thought citizens should reflect in solitude on what was best for the country and that they should not discuss their views before voting.

Rousseau’s point was that the result, when it came, revealed the true will of the people. If you find yourself in the minority, it means you were wrong. Brexit, one might conclude, was the correct choice. ̽��ֱ��48% were simply in error.

A different view is associated with the liberal tradition. Being in the minority says nothing about “right” and “wrong”. It announces simply that you lost. Nothing more, nothing less.

This is an important distinction. If being in the minority means you were wrong, then presumably you wouldn’t be crazy to change your mind. After all, if we assume that everybody is equal in their ability to judge these questions, then the majority is more likely to be right.

But if being in the minority simply means that you lost, then perhaps it’s important that you don’t change your mind, that you don’t stop arguing the issue, and that you don’t stop using all the constitutional means at your disposal to press your case. It is vital to keep alive the arguments that lost the day because in a democracy you always get to fight another one.

Keeping alive those arguments is often difficult. There is always pressure on those who lost to admit they were wrong, to pretend they’ve changed their minds, or at least to shut up. ̽��ֱ��famous phrase “tyranny of the majority” was never just about protecting minority rights; it was about recognising the force of majority opinion.

To suggest that the UK is uniting around Brexit, then, is a danger to democracy itself. That danger comes from pressure on the losers to actually change their minds. Worryingly, this now seems to be May’s position. As she said in a campaign speech near Middlesborough:

You can only deliver Brexit if you believe in Brexit.

I'm not a ‘re-leaver’”, she seemed to be saying. “I’m now a true believer, and you should be too.”

̽��ֱ��other danger is to May. If she thinks the country is really uniting around Brexit, then she could do worse than talk to the street musician interviewed by the Financial Times a few weeks ago: “I don’t think the referendum will be overturned. People seem to think of it as "the people’s vote” and to overturn it would in some way be seen to be undemocratic. People who voted Remain are powerless at the moment.“

He’s right. Those who voted to stay in the EU lost and are, at the moment, powerless. However, politics can change pretty quickly. Support for going ahead with Brexit is broad but shallow. If the economy starts getting worse, the true believers may march on undaunted, eyes fixed firmly on the horizon, but the re-leavers may find their doubts coming back to the surface.

̽��ֱ��more salient number in the survey might turn out to be the true believers, who say they will stick with Brexit whatever the consequences: and that’s only 45%.

This article was originally published on ̽��ֱ��Conversation.

A recent YouGov survey suggests there is increasing agreement that 'Brexit means Brexit'. However, Alfred Moore from the Conspiracy and Democracy Project suspects support is "broad but shallow", and forcing people to change their minds about Brexit poses a danger to democracy.

It is vital to keep alive the arguments that lost the day because in a democracy you always get to fight another one.

Alfred Moore

Anastos Kol

Farewell picture

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Brexit: people are angry but looking for compromise, research finds

fpjl2 — Mon, 22 May 2017 03:15:11 +0000

A new report on public attitudes to the future EU-UK relationship reveals a “striking degree of consensus” that full Single Market access should be retained, while skilled EU migrants – those with a job to come to – should be given entry to the UK labour market in return.

Professor Catherine Barnard and Dr Amy Ludlow, from Cambridge’s Faculty of Law, spent early 2017 canvassing opinion from hundreds of people across the East of England through a series of debates and workshops in schools, community centres and even a prison, as well as gathering views in streets and town squares.

This fieldwork was conducted in locations ranging from the strongly pro-Brexit, including the Lincolnshire town of Boston where the highest Leave vote (75%) was recorded, to Remain strongholds such as the city of Cambridge itself, which voted 73.8% to stay.

̽��ֱ��researchers found that when the public were asked to indicate preferences on the big issues of Brexit, many participants wanted full Single Market access with no free movement or payment to the EU – the position commonly associated with Boris Johnson’s claim that the UK can ‘have its cake and eat it’, something which the EU rejects.

However, when people were presented with current viable options – EU membership, European Economic Area (EEA), Customs Union and ‘hard Brexit’ (i.e. non-membership of the Single Market) – they recognised the need for compromise, and reached an overall consensus that a deal closer to the EEA ‘Norway model’ might be best, at least in the short term.

“ ̽��ֱ��European Economic Area option was consistently seen by Leave and Remain voters alike to be an acceptable compromise that allows limits to freedom of movement and reduces the UK’s financial contribution to the EU. People wanted full access to trade in goods and services with the EU,” said Barnard.

“Remodelling the UK’s relationship along lines similar to the EEA was frequently described as a ‘rebalancing’ rather than pulling up the drawbridge to the world. There was an almost universal desire among the study’s participants for EU citizens who are economically active or want to study in the UK to be able to continue to come.”

̽��ֱ��report, produced as part of the UK in a Changing Europe (UKCE) programme, of which Barnard is a Senior Fellow, also highlights the anger and disappointment people still hold at the conduct of politicians and the media during the referendum campaign.

People on both sides of the debate expressed regret about the sense of division caused by Brexit. Some also reported feeling “embarrassed or awkward” in their relationships with EU nationals. There was also significant anxiety among participants about what might come next, with some describing an “eerie quietness… like the calm before the storm”.

“We found anxiety, but also resentment,” said Barnard. “Many young people, including those in prominent Leave-voting areas, expressed anger at the referendum, and a result they felt they would be living with for the rest of their lives.”

̽��ֱ��researchers also found a serious, often fundamental, lack of knowledge about the EU. Many people struggled to articulate specific examples of the EU’s impact on their lives beyond infamous ‘euromyths’ such as the banning of bendy bananas. Many said they didn’t understand what they were voting for.

̽��ֱ��most commonly cited example of a positive EU impact was no mobile phone roaming charges. Some young people also mentioned the arrival of high-street brands such as Spanish company Zara.

In general, however, Barnard and Ludlow found that it was easier for people who voted Leave to provide examples of how they felt the EU had interfered too much than it was for Remain voters to give concrete examples of the EU’s benefit.

Amy Ludlow said: “A key reason many people gave for voting Remain was inertia, that they saw no good reason to change the status quo. Leave voters could more often give a range of reasons for their vote: from immigration and a perceived erosion of British identity to the promise of additional healthcare funding.”

̽��ֱ��findings will be presented at a public event at Michaelhouse Café in Cambridge on 22 May, where Professor Anand Menon, Director of UKCE, and Dr Angus Armstrong of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, will join Barnard and Ludlow to talk about ‘Brexit, Boston and migration’

Unravelling and reimagining the UK’s relationship with the EU: Public engagement about Brexit in the East of England

Researchers engaged with people across the East of England and found anxiety and resentment, as well as a broad consensus that the UK should remain in the single market.

Remodelling the UK’s relationship along lines similar to the EEA was frequently described as a ‘rebalancing’ rather than pulling up the drawbridge to the world

Catherine Barnard

Unravelling and reimagining the UK’s relationship with the EU

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Listen: Cambridge experts talk post-Brexit options for the UK

fpjl2 — Tue, 04 Apr 2017 13:02:30 +0000

̽��ֱ��one day workshop was run by the Centre For Business Research (CBR) and the Cambridge Public Policy Strategic Research Initiative. On the day, the CBR's Boni Sones sat down with some of the experts to get their take on the major issues facing Brexit Britain. You can listen to their conversations below:

Prof Simon Deakin: Social policy post Brexit and workers’ rights

Simon Deakin is a Professor of Law and the Director of the Centre For Business Research. He specialises in labour law, private law, company law and EU law. His research is concerned, more generally, with the relationship between law and the social sciences.

To what extent we remain outside the Single Market is going to be a matter of degree. ̽��ֱ��current government’s decision for a deep and comprehensive trade agreement actually takes us back in to much of the single market, and we will be bound going forward to single market rules.”
Simon Deakin

Dr Kirsty Hughes: ̽��ֱ��right to remain of EU nationals

Kirsty Hughes is a ̽��ֱ�� Lecturer in Law specialising in Human Rights and Public Law. She lectures on Civil Liberties, European Human Rights Law and Constitutional Law among other areas, and has a forthcoming book on Privacy Theory.

̽��ֱ��suggestion that residency can be used in withdrawal negotiations does seem to be overstating matters given that residency is preserved under human rights law. It will be unlawful for us to expel EU nationals, and given therefore that it would be unlawful it seems particularly insensitive and unfair for EU nationals to be living in a state of uncertainty which is completely unnecessary.
Kirsty Hughes

You can read Dr Hughes's paper on the right to remain of EU nationals in full here.

Dr Michael Waibel: ̽��ֱ��financial cost to the UK of leaving the EU

Michael Waibel is a ̽��ֱ�� Lecturer and Deputy-Director of the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law. He researches economic law with a particular focus on finance and the settlement of international disputes.

̽��ֱ��House of Lords’ assessment as a backdrop to these Brexit negotiations is that there is no legal liability. In purely legal terms I think the House of Lords has got it wrong. ̽��ֱ��UK is in principle liable for a share of the EU’s budget commitments that the UK made as a member of the EU.
Michael Waibel

You can read Dr Waibel's paper on the financial cost of leaving the EU in full here.

Dr Lorand Bartels: ̽��ֱ��WTO option

Lorand Bartels is a Reader in International Law, and teaches international law, WTO law and EU law. He was appointed as a Specialist Adviser to the House of Commons Select Committee on International Trade at the end of last year.

I think legally nothing changes, in terms of the underlying rules and rights and obligations. At the moment the government’s position, and I think it is absolutely correct, is that the UK has existing rights and obligations in the WTO but you don’t see them at the moment because it is exercised via the EU.
Lorand Bartels

Dr Graham Gudgin: A critique of treasury estimates of the impact of Brexit

Graham Gudgin is currently Research Associate at Cambridge's Centre For Business Research and part-time Senior Economic Advisor with Oxford Economics. He has been a Special Adviser to the Northern Ireland First Minister on economic policy.

Over the past 15 years we have created about 3 million extra jobs in the UK, but that has been associated with a rise of about 85 per cent of people born from abroad, and a high proportion of these work on or at the minimum wage. That is not great for productivity...
Graham Gudgin

Prof David Howarth: ̽��ֱ��UK Constitution, the White Paper and the proposed Repeal Act

David Howarth is a Professor of Law and Public Policy in the Department of Land Economy. He served as the Member of Parliament for Cambridge between 2005 and 2010.

A lot of this process is far too short. Designing and drafting new law is not easy. It can’t be done by amateurs, it can’t be done by politicians on the hoof on the floor of the House of Commons. It needs to be thought through and there is just not enough time to think it through.
David Howarth

Dr Martin Steinfeld: ̽��ֱ��Free Movement of People and EU law

Martin Steinfeld is an Affiliated Lecturer in EU law. He was previously a barrister at the Chancery Bar and worked at both the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the European Union.

There are many rights that EU citizens exercising their rights to free movement have had for many years. That is a matter for huge discussion on a domestic level in terms of what pieces of legislation may or may not flow to replicate the rights they already have.
Martin Steinfeld

Prof Catherine Barnard, Prof John Bell and Prof Brendan Simms: ̽��ֱ��White Paper; Brexit and Devolution; the Geopolitics of Brexit

Catherine Barnard is a Professor of European Union Law and Fellow of the UK in a Changing Europe programme.
John Bell is a Professor of Law and Director of the Centre for Public Law.
Brendan Simms is Professor in the History of International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Studies.

̽��ֱ��actual logistics of disentangling ourselves from the EU are incredibly large and it will take a considerable period of time – certainly more than the two years the government thinks it can be done in.
Catherine Barnard

Dr Julian Ghosh: Brexit and our tax laws

Julian Ghosh is a QC and Bye-Fellow at Peterhouse, Cambridge. His practice covers all areas of taxation. He is particularly well known for his corporate work and that involving European taxation issues.

[Business] could say you said we were subject to EU law previous to this date but this post two year date decision tells us what that law actually is, so see you in court. It is hopeless for the government and business.
Julian Ghosh

On 30 March, the day after the 'triggering' of Article 50 began the official Brexit process, a group of ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge lawyers, economists, historians and tax experts gathered in Peterhouse.

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Opinion: ̽��ֱ��Great Repeal Bill White Paper in 20 tweets

fpjl2 — Fri, 31 Mar 2017 09:17:59 +0000

The tweets have been collected below. A longer piece from Prof Elliott on the White Paper and the key areas of constitutional law and politics it engages, is available on his blog site Public Law for Everyone.

̽��ֱ��White Paper

̽��ֱ��Great Repeal Bill White Paper has been published. It is available here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-great-repeal-bill-white-paper

— Mark Elliott (@ProfMarkElliott) March 30, 2017

General approach

No major changes beyond what's necessary, but will accommodate possibility of functioning statute book if no deal. Hard circle to square. pic.twitter.com/8rifGZpsoe

— Mark Elliott (@ProfMarkElliott) March 30, 2017

̽��ֱ��three key elements of the Great Repeal Bill:

Repeal ECA

Convert EU law

'Correct' the statute book. pic.twitter.com/pJjOpbJqrN

— Mark Elliott (@ProfMarkElliott) March 30, 2017

EU law and UK law

Directly applicable EU law will be converted into domestic law.

Domestic law that already gives effect to EU law will be preserved. pic.twitter.com/jz6b023ivU

— Mark Elliott (@ProfMarkElliott) March 30, 2017

̽��ֱ��case law of the Court of Justice of the EU

UK courts interpreting domesticated EU law will be required to do so 'by reference to ' CJEU case law as it stands on Brexit Day. pic.twitter.com/bauQZDeKn9

— Mark Elliott (@ProfMarkElliott) March 30, 2017

Pre-Brexit Day CJEU case law will have same domestic status in terms of precedent as UK Supreme Court judgments. Music to Brexiters' ears. pic.twitter.com/ViHATAB5qL

— Mark Elliott (@ProfMarkElliott) March 30, 2017

Supremacy of EU law

'General supremacy' of EU law to be ended: new UK legislation will take priority over EU-derived law that is preserved by Great Repeal Bill. pic.twitter.com/yTwKlYjr5h

— Mark Elliott (@ProfMarkElliott) March 30, 2017

But EU-derived law will continue to take priority over pre-Brexit Day UK law, including Acts of Parliament. More music to Brexiters' ears. pic.twitter.com/GQ2MlwDbFt

— Mark Elliott (@ProfMarkElliott) March 30, 2017

Delegated powers

'Very significant proportion' of EU-derived law contains provisions that will not be workable post-Brexit. ̽��ֱ��solution? Delegated powers. pic.twitter.com/OLHIA4KHnZ

— Mark Elliott (@ProfMarkElliott) March 30, 2017

Delegated powers will enable statute book to be 'corrected'; for problems to be 'rectified'. Devil is in detail of what those terms mean. pic.twitter.com/o1mMJ7D5bD

— Mark Elliott (@ProfMarkElliott) March 30, 2017

These are circumstances in which Government says secondary legislation will be justified. In combination, these circumstances are very broad pic.twitter.com/ZOaLr0bCzH

— Mark Elliott (@ProfMarkElliott) March 30, 2017

Delegated power not to be used for policy changes unconnected by deficiencies in EU-derived law. Implies some policy changes *will* be made. pic.twitter.com/3A2RUGs05C

— Mark Elliott (@ProfMarkElliott) March 30, 2017

Up to 1,000 statutory instruments (piece of delegated legislation made by Ministers) will be needed to make EU-derived law work post-Brexit. pic.twitter.com/KW4Lib2Emy

— Mark Elliott (@ProfMarkElliott) March 30, 2017

Parliamentary scrutiny

'Right balance' must be struck between need to 'speed' & 'scrutiny'. Existing processes to be used. No plan for super-affirmative procedure pic.twitter.com/VkthcjCSxW

— Mark Elliott (@ProfMarkElliott) March 30, 2017

White Paper is 'beginning of a discussion' about approach to scrutiny of delegated powers. Govt's thinking looks extremely undeveloped here. pic.twitter.com/7tbXD3XpFL

— Mark Elliott (@ProfMarkElliott) March 30, 2017

White Paper fails to engage in meaningful way with HL Constitution Committee's detailed proposals for scrutiny. See https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2017/03/07/the-great-repeal-bill-and-delegated-powers/

— Mark Elliott (@ProfMarkElliott) March 30, 2017

Devolution

Just over one page in the White Paper on 'interaction with the devolution settlements'. pic.twitter.com/D9AiGF0xWZ

— Mark Elliott (@ProfMarkElliott) March 30, 2017

No guarantee that repatriated EU powers will go to devolved institutions, even in relation to subject-areas that are currently devolved. pic.twitter.com/i1ZxCpN1No

— Mark Elliott (@ProfMarkElliott) March 30, 2017

Implication seems to be *new* reserved matters will be carved out of existing devolution settlements. Raises some Qs of const'l politics.

— Mark Elliott (@ProfMarkElliott) March 30, 2017

On other hand, even if there are some new reservations to devolved competence, Govt anticipates overall net expansion of devolved competence pic.twitter.com/QMPP24b3yk

— Mark Elliott (@ProfMarkElliott) March 30, 2017

Mark Elliott, Professor of Public Law, posted a number of tweets yesterday extracting key paragraphs from the Government’s White Paper on the Great Repeal Bill and offering some preliminary thoughts.

̽��ֱ��text in this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. For image use please see separate credits above.

Yes

Opinion: ̽��ֱ��Road to Brexit, or the UK’s Journey into the Unknown

ag236 — Wed, 29 Mar 2017 09:33:48 +0000

As the Prime Minister signed the letter triggering Article 50 – the "divorce clause" in the EU treaties that provides the only legal route for the UK to withdraw from the EU — we reached the end of the beginning.

For nine months the UK and the EU have been in limbo. In the days and weeks following the June 2016 referendum, those who advocated leaving the EU were quick to claim that the much-heralded economic disasters threatened by George Osborne and David Cameron in “Project Fear” had not occurred.

Unhappy Remainers were equally swift in their rebuttals, as proponents of the two camps seemed determined to replay the arguments of their respective referendum campaigns – and in some cases the arguments of more than four decades.

Certainly, while the value of sterling might have dropped and inflation begun to rise, the economic indicators are far from the nightmare scenarios invoked during the referendum. But that scenario was based on the idea that Cameron would trigger Article 50 immediately upon a Leave vote; in practice, he left the field, and his successor delayed the fateful act.

These last nine months have thus been little more than a phoney war. ̽��ֱ��UK has barely begun to outline its negotiating objectives, while the other 27 member states made clear they would not engage in discussions before the UK formally indicated its intention to leave the Union. That day has now come.

̽��ֱ��nature of the UK’s future relationship with the EU remains unclear, although the Prime Minister’s construal of the vote to leave the EU as a sign of popular support for curbing immigration has led to one clear red line: that the UK will not seek to remain in the single market.

This decision is perfectly rational and logical if one accepts the Prime Minister’s premise regarding the reasons 17 million people voted to leave, since free movement of people is a prerequisite of membership of the single market.

Yet, there is good cause to believe Mrs May is misguided in her interpretation: there were myriad reasons for the leave votes, whether to reclaim sovereignty or reduce payments to the EU, all neatly encapsulated in the beguiling phrase “take back control”.

For many of those who voted leave, immigration and free movement were not the reason to seek EU withdrawal; even many Leavers acknowledge the importance of EU nationals to the UK economy.

To base a decision to leave the single market on the premise that we shall thereby "control" immigration is only a plausible thesis if those advocating it believe that Leave voters intended to prioritise controlling immigration numbers over the security of the economy, our agriculture and our welfare services, including the NHS and care of the elderly –all of which are heavily dependent upon immigrant labour.

Nonetheless, the Prime Minister appears to have adopted an approach that endears her to the hard Brexiteers in her own party, allowing a clean break from the EU, even if a majority in the country seems to favour a closer ongoing relationship with the 27.

For a city such as Cambridge, and for the ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge especially, membership of the single market with its associated rights of free movement is self-evidently beneficial. Many academics, myself included, have benefited over the years from EU funding – but what is at least as important is the opportunity to collaborate across borders, without having to consider whether a visa is needed.

EU nationals from other countries have played a vital role as students and colleagues. Even Brexiteers who wanted to reduce immigration were broadly in favour of guaranteeing the rights of EU nationals who were already in the UK at the time of the referendum.

Alongside many of us who would have preferred the UK not to be in the EU’s departure lounge, some of those Leavers have been demanding that the Government should give a unilateral undertaking to EU nationals already in the UK. ̽��ֱ��Government has said such people, along with UK nationals resident elsewhere in the EU, will be their first priority in the negotiations.

This is laudable, although it fails to comprehend a key facet of EU negotiations: nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.

̽��ֱ��campaign to secure the rights of EU nationals will no doubt continue in the hope that some of the uncertainty engendered by the process of Brexit can be minimised, though the idea that some issues can be picked off and resolved in tranches is almost certainly fanciful.

Meanwhile, the withdrawal negotiations are likely to take the two years envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty – and that will only resolve the divorce settlement. For the longer term future arrangements with the 27, further, more protracted negotiations are likely. Triggering Article 50 is not the end, though it would seem to herald the beginning of the end of the UK’s membership of the EU.

Dr Julie Smith is Director of the European Centre in the POLIS Department and a Liberal Democrat member of the House of Lords. Her new book, ̽��ֱ��UK’s Journeys Into and Out of the EU: Destinations Unknown, is published by Routledge.

̽��ֱ��Prime Minister's triggering of Article 50 is merely the end of the beginning, argues Dr Julie Smith

̽��ֱ��text in this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. For image use please see separate credits above.

Yes