̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge - extremism

Psychological ‘signature’ for the extremist mind uncovered

fpjl2 — Mon, 22 Feb 2021 08:36:56 +0000

Scientists have mapped an underlying “psychological signature” for people who are predisposed to holding extreme social, political or religious attitudes – and support violence in the name of ideology.

Media fuelling rising hostility towards Muslims in Britain

sjr81 — Thu, 28 Apr 2016 13:46:18 +0000

̽��ֱ��findings, drawn from research developed across the ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge and presented to journalists, politicians and lawmakers, as well as representatives of faith communities, found Britain’s Muslim communities – fragmented and often uncomfortable with the media – to be ill-equipped to counter negative narratives with more balanced reporting.

“Can we have freedom and security at the same time?” said Roxane Farmanfarmaian, lead scholar on the ESRC project and principal at the Centre of the International Studies of the Middle East and North Africa (CIRMENA). “And how do we balance the right to speak and think freely with the protections necessary for a life without fear?

“In January 2015, the attack on Charlie Hebdo brought into focus how vulnerable the relationship is between free speech and the security of the societies in which we live. Fulfilling its responsibilities to its citizens, the government enacted laws to suppress extremist activity, clamp down on radicalisation and protect British values. This included ‘vocal opposition to British values’. Does this mean protecting a key universal right has in fact restricted it?”

̽��ֱ��Rt Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, Home Office Minister on the Counter-Extremism Strategy, highlighted the significance of the research for government and his intention to share it with officials across government, including immigration ministers and ministers within the Department of Media, Culture and Sport.

Roundtable attendees discussed ways to protect freedom of speech in religious contexts, promote integration, and further the successes of multiculturalism. ̽��ֱ��discussion developed ten points for joint action by policymakers and the media. These range from appointing a celebrity role model as a Muslim Media Relations officer, to creating community relations reporters in minority communities (see below).

These points, and the findings, were reported as part of growing coverage on the worrying rise in media interpretations of Islamophobia, public disaffection and Islamic community isolation in ̽��ֱ��Independent and al-Jazeera Online English.

̽��ֱ��Roundtable was organized by CIRMENA, in partnership with Cambridge’s the Woolf Institute and the Centre of Islamic Studies, and made possible through the support of an ESRC Impact Acceleration Action Programme Grant..

A Home Office network, as part of the Government’s Counter-Extremism Strategy linking individuals and groups standing up to extremism in their communities, will draw on findings from this research.

Ten recommended action points:

To stem the slide toward an increasingly divided society, establish a consulting forum led by media and government to facilitate professional communications practices for mosque leaderships, neighbourhood centres, charities, schools and other minority group institutions. ̽��ֱ��goal: to enable them effectively to promote, and publish more balanced narratives about their communities.
Appoint a well-recognized figure (for example, a celebrity role model) as a Muslim Media Relations Officer to encourage contextual awareness and media education surrounding minority group issues and perspectives; the position would be responsible for representing the multiple viewpoints necessary to serve as an effective spokesperson for the Muslim community as a whole. ̽��ֱ��Muslim Media Relations Officer would be a member of the consulting forum (see above).
Encourage media employment of ‘community relations’ reporters as specialist correspondents (much like political, financial and health editors), to improve the balance in reportage on faith and other minority affairs. ̽��ֱ��remit should include, 1. Improving domestic awareness of counter-narratives, 2. Bettering understanding of how global events shape British responses to local communities, 3. Enhancing comprehension of the connections between local (diaspora) communities and their countries of origin, including the sharing of discourses, entertainment preferences and ideological attitudes.
Build media resources within minority communities that actively encourage capacity building, and that can provide tools, such as media training programmes. ̽��ֱ��goal: to engage community members, especially youths, in developing skills for effective media planning, and interaction.
Encourage trusts, foundations and other civil society and mainstream opinion-forming organizations to partner with and include Muslim and other minority representatives, especially women.
Actively support all affirmative engagement with majority community values through positive role models the Muslim community can identify with.
Promote opportunities for Muslim role models to provide inspiration to minority groups, including youth and women.
Support British media productions (drama series, soap operas, documentaries, films, talk shows, game shows, reality TV and other entertainments) that feature minority figures and local minority group issues. ̽��ֱ��goal: to raise the competitive edge of British output vis-à-vis the consumption needs of this audience, and increase the visibility of British, over country-of-origin, media offerings.
Encourage clear definitions of radicalisation (as terminology) to be circulated within the law enforcement and security agencies, and put in place guidelines to protect individuals from agency profiling.
Assign minority group coverage to non-minority reporters and editors, so as to broaden awareness and avoid ‘ghettoisation’ of minority coverage. Develop and promote context-sensitive awareness and language use among staff.

Mainstream media reporting about Muslim communities is contributing to an atmosphere of rising hostility towards Muslims in Britain, according to a ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge/ESRC Roundtable held at the House of Lords.

̽��ֱ��attack on Charlie Hebdo brought into focus how vulnerable the relationship is between free speech and the security of the societies in which we live.

Roxane Farmanfarmaian

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Opinion: Confronting the Taliban – an educational encounter

Anonymous — Wed, 09 Mar 2016 15:23:46 +0000

In a country that has five million children out of school (three million of them girls) it may seem incongruous to prioritise higher education. But prestigious higher education institutions, such as Edwardes College in Peshawar – where I was principal from 2006-2010 – are capable of producing the calibre of leaders able to address the full range of educational issues.

Edwardes College, affiliated to the ̽��ֱ�� of Peshawar, is one of a number of higher education institutions in south Asia founded a hundred or more years ago by British administrators and missionaries. Although conceived by the utilitarian administrators of the Raj as the creator of interpreters between themselves and “those whom we govern” – to quote the imperious Lord Macaulay – it initially taught in the local vernaculars and have maintained well above average academic standards. ̽��ֱ��College's progressive ethos and international contacts have enabled them to take on board the education of women and disadvantaged minorities more readily than comparable educational institutions, and they have consistently trained some of the most outstanding leaders from the south Asian region.

In the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly the North-West Frontier Province) Edwardes College was the first men’s college to admit women, the first of whom was admitted to the computer science department. By the time I joined in 2006 about 10% of 2000 students were women, and there was a somewhat higher proportion of women lecturers. By the time I left both proportions were significantly higher, and the college boasted a well-equipped women’s centre. When some of the more conservative professors complained about my preoccupation with women’s participation my answer was always in terms of the examination results: at the end of my fourth and final year the 14% of the total student body who were women were carrying off 53% of the top academic prizes.

There are considerable differences between the social situations of women in different parts of the Pakistan/Afghan region. Benazir Bhutto, from a rich landowning family in Sindh, was not only prime minister of Pakistan twice but, as an undergraduate at Oxford ̽��ֱ��, was president of the Oxford Union Society. However, in Pashtun society, on both sides of the border, women are unlikely to achieve such distinction; their literacy rate is much lower than that of men, and many are severely discriminated against. They can vote in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, but may be prevented from doing so by their menfolk and public opinion. Child marriage was made illegal in Pakistan in 2000 but continues in some places.

̽��ֱ��Taliban’s opposition to women’s education (or sometimes only to co-education) was aggravated during the late 1970s and 1980s when General Zia-ul-Haq became president of Pakistan and imposed a rigid version of Sharia law. In some respects this was surprising because Zia’s early years had been spent as a student in the liberal and cosmopolitan atmosphere of St. Stephen’s College in Delhi. With funds from Saudi Arabia he constructed large numbers of madrasas along the Pakistan/Afghan border, populating them with imported Wahabi mullahs. Such policies paved the way for Taliban militants from Afghanistan to find refuge in these same tribal border regions from which they could plan campaigns inside both countries.

Peshawar bore the brunt of a furious backlash by Taliban militants against “soft” targets during much of my tenure as Edwardes College principal. What happened recently in Paris happened on a monthly basis with much the same number of casualties. ̽��ֱ��international press only began to pay attention to these in September 2013 when suicide bombers killed over a hundred worshippers at All Saints’ Church (four were my own former students). Then in December 2014 a hundred and forty children were shot to death at the Army Public School in Peshawar. ̽��ֱ��first incident was stated by the Taliban to be a response to US drone attacks in the tribal areas, the second a reaction to Army atrocities in Waziristan.

One of the most effective counters to terrorism is quality education which offers hope and employment to the disenfranchised youth in places such as these border areas of Pakistan. A few years ago the former Master of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, Haroon Ahmed, collaborated with General Musharraf and Atta ur Rahman, the distinguished Pakistani chemist, to set up several technological and vocational universities in Pakistan with funding and personnel from several countries, which, unfortunately, did not include the UK. This programme collapsed when General Musharraf left office, but it is an example of the kind of initiative which could help to redress the current imbalances of opportunity between rich industrial countries and their poorer counterparts.

On the basis of my educational experiences in Pakistan such collaborative activities will not lead to a lowering of standards – possibly even the contrary – and will equip and encourage potential leaders (and especially women) from unstable areas to rectify the unjust imbalances which fuel much current domestic and international violence.

David L. Gosling's new book, Frontier of Fear: Confronting the Taliban on Pakistan’s Border, is now available, published by London, IB Tauris ( ̽��ֱ��Radcliffe Press), 2016.

Dr Gosling will launch the book at an event in Magdalene College, with an introduction by the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, on Wednesday 9 March at 6:00pm. All welcome.

Inset images: David Gosling at Edwardes College (David Gosling); Taliban ammunition (Resolute Support Media).

Dr David Gosling (Faculty of Divinity) discusses his time on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, his encounters with the Taliban and why education is the best weapon against terrorism.

One of the most effective counters to terrorism is quality education which offers hope and employment to the disenfranchised youth in places such as these border areas of Pakistan

David Gosling

Hashoo Foundation USA on Flickr

Pakistan schoolgirl

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Opinion: Why both sides are wrong in the counter-extremism debate

Anonymous — Mon, 07 Mar 2016 11:55:23 +0000

Recently published evidence submitted to the parliamentary inquiry into extremism and the government’s Prevent strategy sheds light on the current debates around counter-extremism in Britain – and it’s clear from reading the submissions and watching the evidence that the debate has reached an impasse.

Those who support and those who criticise the government’s Prevent strategy are in deadlock, caught in a cycle of unhelpful rhetoric and political posturing, and unable to offer viable alternatives to the problems they perceive.

Under the direction of chair, Keith Vaz MP, the Home Affairs Committee is investigating issues around Islamic extremism, terrorist recruitment, and the effectiveness of the Prevent strategy.

̽��ֱ��de-facto leader of the pro-Prevent lobby is David Cameron who has repeatedly voiced his concerns over extremist Islamic ideology while calling for a Muslim revival of “British” values. His position has been backed by the Tony Blair Foundation which also regards “bad” ideology as the prime driver of extremism. ̽��ֱ��Quilliam Foundation, meanwhile, identifies the ongoing threat of “salafi-jihadi” ideology and assorted think-tanks applaud various sophisticated programmes of initiatives (usually their own). But there are some major weaknesses in their position.

Need for clarity

First of all, they ignore the problems faced by teachers and lecturers – now under a legal duty to report and tackle extremism – who are clearly confused about the implications of this new duty and are ill-prepared for the problems that will inevitably arise in the classroom. And who can blame them when the very notion of what constitutes “extremism” or, for that matter, British values, is so vaguely defined in the Prevent strategy.

̽��ֱ��strategy also ignores the main drivers of this so-called “extremism” among many young people – not just young Muslims. Young Muslims are angry about British foreign policy, about perceived injustices to Muslims living abroad, and the relentlessly negative reporting in the UK media of Islam. They bear the brunt of Islamophobia, now increasingly apparent in civil society (especially against women), as well as the social and economic disadvantage caused by high unemployment.

These criticisms of perceived extremism fail to tackle the question of what sorts of attitudes and practices might be considered “less dangerous” and what exactly should lawful political dissent among British Muslim youth look like? What are the “acceptable” limits of social and religious conservatism within Britain’s mosques and madrassas, for example? How should increasingly online global communities of Muslims forge their identities? And how can we increase mutual trust between Muslims and non-Muslims in Britain?

Cameron and his supporters offer us few clues. Alison Jamieson, the author of Radicalism and Terrorism: A Teacher’s Handbook for Addressing Extremism, recommends (in arguably the most coherent written submission to the inquiry) the creation of “safe spaces” that might encourage classroom discussion of political violence, the terminology of terrorism, and peace-making through conflict resolution. It is hard to argue against such sensible suggestions. None have come from Cameron’s speeches.

Anger and confusion

But few of the critics of the government’s counter-extremism policy offer reasonable alternatives. There are some sensible voices: Universities UK, which represents vice-chancellors and principals of British university institutions, argues, with much justification, that current counter-extremism laws create anger and confusion among their members, pose a threat to freedom of speech, and drive controversial and offensive views underground.

̽��ֱ��National Association of Head Teachers, while broadly supportive of the legal duty on teachers, criticises the current lack of effective training and the uncertainty around ill-defined terms. Others argue more forcefully. In their written submission, representatives from the East London Mosque repeat the words of former senior police officer Dal Babu, who last year described Prevent as a “toxic brand”. Cage UK, which has campaigned against the perceived impacts of the “War on Terror”, calls for the abolition of all counter-extremism legislation.

These submissions demonstrate the growing confidence with which the government’s counter-extremism strategy is now attacked. But a glaring absence from this side of the debate is the lack of any suggestions concerning alternative models of security and policing. What are the current threats we face? What are the “acceptable” boundaries of our freedoms and our security? How should the government protect us?

Squandered opportunities

Organisations representing the interests of British Muslim communities could more often dictate the pace and direction of the extremism debate – but the inquiry evidence suggests only squandered opportunities. Several written submissions contain complaints (some more understandable than others) about inquiry questions perceived by the witnesses as excessively hostile. Others waste energy debating funding and transparency issues, pursuing personal interests rather than community concerns.

There are notable exceptions – various community groups presented evidence of actual criminal activity by Muslim perpetrators, while another submission raised the issue of the repatriation of those who have returned from IS-held territories – a real-world problem requiring a practical solution.

̽��ֱ��Home Affairs Committee is now in recess, deliberating over the submitted evidence and no doubt drafting recommendations. Mine would be two-fold: first, and as Anderson argues, an independent review of the government’s Prevent strategy is urgently needed. Second, we need a government-led initiative that encourages mainstream political engagement from young British Muslims.

Cameron talks of “British” and “liberal” values – and there are none finer than our tradition of political dissent. British by Dissent, a report published by Muslim Youth Helpline provides an example of how Muslim organisations can take back control of the debate around political engagement among British Muslim communities.

It’s clear from the submitted evidence that a better balance of freedom and protection is needed. Such a balance is achievable – but only if each side in the extremism debate begins to the see the world through the other’s eyes.

Julian Hargreaves, Research Associate at the Centre of Islamic Studies, ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge

This article was originally published on ̽��ֱ��Conversation. Read the original article.

̽��ֱ��opinions expressed in this article are those of the individual author(s) and do not represent the views of the ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge.

Inset image: Keith Vaz, who chairs the Home Affairs Committee inquiry into counter-extremism measures (UK Parliament).

Julian Hargreaves (Centre of Islamic Studies) discusses the Government's Prevent strategy and counter-extremism in Britain.

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Opinion: Governments should turn to academics for advice on radicalisation, religion and security

Anonymous — Thu, 03 Dec 2015 15:30:10 +0000

In August 1939, the operational head of Britain’s Government Communication and Cypher School, Alistair Denniston, wrote to the Foreign Office about the need to recruit “men of the professor type” into the wartime code-breaking hub at Bletchley Park in order to help combat the Nazi threat.

Following the horror of marauding attacks in Paris, the British prime minister has announced he will be recruiting a further 1,900 personnel to the Security and Intelligence Agencies. “Professors” may also be able to add value to these organisations and wider society. ̽��ֱ��government should not forget the wealth of talent available within our universities to offer insight and depth to the judgments of decision-makers.

In my capacity as champion to the Partnership for Conflict, Crime & Security Research, I organised a workshop recently where four leading academics discussed how best to get research on religion and contemporary security challenges in front of politicians, policymakers and the press, to help them deliver better service to the public. ̽��ֱ��academics were historian of Muslim thought Robert Gleave; Kim Knott who researches ideologies, beliefs and decision-making; Peter Morey who explores trust between Muslims and non-Muslims, and John Wolffe who works on the interface between religion and security.

One key message from this debate was that those in positions of authority and influence must overcome the tendency to regard religious issues as marginal until they become a security risk. Religion is poorly understood, and while academic focus on definition can be dismissed as pedantry, there is a need for clarity when talking about religion and security – to avoid millions of devout people around the world being swept into a bucket labelled “terrorist”.

Improve religious literacy

For instance, research helps us to draw a distinction between religion and faith. Religion is defined by creed, doctrine, framework and practice; whereas faith is more personal, abstract, emotional and often at some distance from the teachings of established religious institutions.

We must improve religious literacy among politicians, policymakers, the press and the general public. In a security context, this should include a more nuanced understanding of the variants of institutionalised religion, while comprehending the universe occupied by men and women of faith.

A single office of responsibility in the government could act as a conduit for informing and shaping policy and legislation relating to religion and religious issues, including those linked to security and violence. An immediate priority for the office should be to inform efforts to address radicalisation, Islamophobia and other forms of prejudice. This wouldn’t carry any extra cost if one of the government’s chief scientific advisors was asked to undertake this work, tapping into the wealth of expertise addressing these issues inside the nation’s universities.

Opinion-formers, including those in the press, must also resist the simplistic temptation to describe religion as the motive for acts of violence. In the same way, “Third World” insurgents during the Cold War, such as those in North Vietnam, were too easily defined by the Communist ideology they embraced.

How to dispel alienation

But closer attention needs to be paid to the relationship between faith and alienation. There is a wealth of research – including historian Kate Cooper’s work into the radicalisation of early Christian martyrs over 1,500 years’ ago – that can help us understand how alienation, especially of young people, leads to a sense of hopelessness that translates all too readily into violent resolve.

We must galvanise support for the public sector, faith groups and charities to promote engagement between polarised communities. But this is not a simple matter of issuing a commandment from on-high that: “thou shalt engage in mutually informative dialogue and develop trustful relationships”.

Evidence and experience, for instance from Northern Ireland, shows how different the certainties of macro-political strategies can be from micro-realities, leading to communities being filled with mistrust and disillusionment. Interventions tailored to dispel alienation and build trust must reflect local circumstances, with a strong emphasis on “bottom-up” rather than “top-down” solutions.

There are some powerful examples of how the arts can operate to communicate religious difference in our complex, multicultural society, but common artistic endeavor can also help heal divisions. For example, the UK-based Berakah Choir works to transcend barriers of faith and culture through collaborative activities, allowing the individual voice to be heard working in harmony with others to build a common humanity. There is much that could be achieved at a low cost to harness the arts to counter alienation.

Draw on academics as an asset

Western governments are deploying a range of strategies and tactics to deal with the threat posed by the so-called Islamic State. David Cameron is recruiting more spies, and parliament is discussing profound changes to the way in which digital intelligence is collected.

Great minds were brought together at Bletchley. Marcin Wichary/flickr.com, CC BY

But we must not ignore the invaluable supply of knowledge and insight available from our men and women in academia. Research can provide evidence-based context to contemporary challenges, including an enlightened understanding of the place of religion and faith in a security context.

We can stop mistakes being made in terms of misguided policies and knee-jerk reactions. And researchers can help the design and deployment of interventions that make a real difference, focusing limited resources effectively.

It has been said that the scholars working in Bletchley Park saved countless lives and took one or more years off the duration of World War II. Let us hope that politicians, policy-makers and the press are enlightened enough to make full use of the contribution that university researchers can make to today’s security challenges.

Tristram Riley-Smith, Associate Fellow, Centre for Science and Policy; Director of Research, Department of Politics & International Studies, ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge

This article was originally published on ̽��ֱ��Conversation. Read the original article.

̽��ֱ��opinions expressed in this article are those of the individual author(s) and do not represent the views of the ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge.

Tristram Riley-Smith (Department of Politics and International Studies) discusses how universities and academics can add insight and depth to national security decisions.

Takver

Bataclan Paris attacks memorial

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From one extreme to the next?

lw355 — Thu, 05 Feb 2015 10:56:30 +0000

A radical Islamist group has exploited the vacuum created by civil war to capture cities, towns and oil fields across Syria and Iraq – leaving horror and destruction in their wake. Although this might seem unique to a post-9/11 world, religious radicalism exploiting a power vacuum is not new, as research going back 30 years to a different civil war in the same region is showing.

Since April 2013, the Sunni jihadist group Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, referred to as the ‘Islamic State’ (IS, or Isis), has taken control of vast swathes of Syrian and Iraqi territory, bringing with it an onslaught of appalling atrocities and acts of cruelty. “It will take some time before its full impact is determined… [the threat it poses] is unprecedented in the modern age,” stated a recent report by the Soufan Group, a security intelligence firm in New York.

Meanwhile, Syrian refugees, fleeing IS and the bitter civil war, continue to spill across the borders of neighbouring states, straining their own societies and resources. Lebanon in particular has been greatly affected – almost a quarter of its current population are Syrian refugees.

Yet, while the sudden appearance of reports about the barbarity of IS makes this seem like an unprecedented shock, new research is starting to show that parallels may exist in the recent past.

In the 1980s, Lebanon itself witnessed the ascent of one such precursor Islamic movement, known as ‘Tawheed’, during the country’s civil war. Raphaël Lefèvre, a Gates Cambridge Scholar and PhD candidate working with Professor George Joffe in the Department of Politics and International Studies, and until recently a visiting fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center, is researching its rise and fall.

His work investigates the ways in which the group seized control of the northern port city of Tripoli and imposed its conservative agenda on locals, before being largely rejected and marginalised by civil society and leftist militants. “While it’s important to keep in mind that history does not necessarily repeat itself, the parallels are great between the history of the rise and fall of Tawheed’s emirate in Tripoli and the current rule of the Islamic State,” he said.

IS may have few obvious antecedents in terms of the way in which its members practise their extremism, but because the pattern of its emergence presents a striking echo of those of earlier radical forces, says researcher Lefèvre, this pattern may provide pointers as to the direction and trajectory of IS.

He also hopes that his research on the events of the 1980s in Lebanon will focus attention on the roots of an increasingly unstable situation in the country. ̽��ֱ��timing of his research is poignant, given that street violence is rising, sectarianism is reaching boiling point and IS has now inaugurated a Lebanese chapter in Tripoli.

Today, references to the failed ‘Tawheed phenomenon’ are common among the citizens of Tripoli. During a year-long visit to Lebanon, where he has now returned, Lefèvre spoke to many who remember the events of the 1980s, and he finds commonalities between Tawheed and IS.

When Tawheed seized control, it imposed its ideological and religious norms on the people, but it also began to fill the socioeconomic gap left by the absence of a Lebanese state during the civil war. “They filled a void – provided security, ran hospitals and even gave education to the kids,” he explained.

Likewise, IS has both imposed a harsh conservative social agenda on the population who live under its sway and used resources such as oil and gas fields to win over locals. “They distribute subsidies and provide state-like services to a population in severe need given the quasi-absence of the Syrian state in remote areas outside of Damascus.”

Just like IS, Tripoli’s Tawheed movement was led by a charismatic figure, the Sunni cleric Said Shaaban. He gathered under his wing three Islamist groups that merged together to form Tawheed. Their aim was to struggle against impurities in society – the warlords and drug dealers – in accordance with Sharia law.

“But, once Tawheed seized control of the city in 1983, all of these grand goals very quickly disappeared. People started realising that there wasn’t much that was Islamic about the group; it was just another political faction trying to rule their city instead of Syria and Israel, and in increasingly corrupt and murky ways.”

After three years, and in the face of pressure from the Syrian regime, internal disagreements over deciding the group’s next steps led to its collapse from within.

IS, too, has been linked with corruption, including suggestions that the organisation has been selling looted antiquities and earning significant amounts from the oil fields it controls in eastern Syria by selling supplies to the Syrian government and across the borders into Turkish and Jordanian underworlds.

Tawheed lost legitimacy when it began to be perceived as a militia using a religious discourse to mobilise people. Lefèvre believes that movements collapse when they try to force society to adapt to their norms: “very often, civil society resists and in the end strikes back.”

In Lebanon today, he sees an increasing feeling of socioeconomic and political marginalisation on the part of Lebanon’s Sunni community – a “highly toxic cocktail”, he calls it, of unemployment, low literacy rates and poverty, leading many to turn away from the state and look for alternative sources of support and protection, including joining Islamic groups. He fears that the current situation may lead back to a situation not dissimilar to that witnessed in the 1980s.

“ ̽��ֱ��influence of the Syrian crisis on Lebanon is very real. Ultimately, whether the country is able to weather the storm, or fall prey to civil war and the rise of extremism, will depend on the ability of Lebanese policymakers to address issues that have long been ignored.”

As for the future of IS, Lefèvre says: “It is unpopular in the cities it is controlling, but we are not yet seeing so much resistance – possibly because of the socioeconomic help they currently provide. While the same collapse may not necessarily happen to IS, the rise and fall of Tawheed shows that internal tensions within a group – whether about the group’s leadership or its priorities – are an important factor that should be taken into account to understand how such movements operate. ̽��ֱ��‘IS phenomenon’ is in fact far from being a new one.”

̽��ֱ��threat to peace posed by the Islamic State group has been described as “unprecedented in the modern age”, yet research on the rise and fall of an extremist group in 1980s Lebanon suggests that we may have seen this all before.

While it’s important to keep in mind that history does not necessarily repeat itself, the parallels are great between the history of the rise and fall of Tawheed’s emirate in Tripoli and the current rule of the Islamic State

Raphael Lefevre

Derek Henry Flood

Lebanon, after the 2006 war

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