̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge - ethics

Opinion: the future of science is automation

Anonymous — Mon, 26 Feb 2024 13:02:43 +0000

Thanks to the widespread availability of food and medical care, the ability to travel, and many other scientific and technological developments, billions of people today are living better lives than kings of centuries past. It is deeply surprising to me how little appreciated this astonishing fact is.

Of course, despite all the progress we’ve made, the world faces many challenges in the 21st century: climate change, pandemics, poverty and cancer, to name just a few.

If all the countries in the world could join together to share technology and resources, we might be to deal with and overcome these challenges. However, history presents no example of such collaboration, and the current geopolitical situation does not offer much in the way of hope.

Our best hope of dealing with these challenges is to make science and technology more productive. ̽��ֱ��only feasible way to achieve this is through the integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and laboratory automation.

AI systems already possess superhuman scientific powers. They can remember massive volumes of facts and learn from huge datasets. They can execute flawless logical reasoning, and near optimal probabilistic reasoning. They are can read every scientific paper, indeed everything ever written. These powers are complimentary to human scientists.

When the scientific method was developed in the 17th century, one of the core insights was the need to conduct experiments in the physical world, not just to think.

Today, laboratory automation is steadily advancing, and robots can now carry out most of the laboratory tasks that humans can. We are also now seeing the emergence of the ‘Cloud Lab’ concept. ̽��ֱ��idea is to provide laboratory automation at scale and remotely, with scientists sending their samples to the cloud lab, using a computer interface to design and execute their experiments.

And then there are AI Scientists: AI systems integrated with laboratory automations that are capable of carrying out the closed-loop automation of scientific research (aka 'Robot Scientists', 'Self-driving Labs'). These systems automatically originate hypotheses to explain observations, devise experiments to test these hypotheses, physically run these experiments using laboratory robotics, interpret the results, and then repeat the cycle.

AI Scientists can work cheaper, faster, more accurately, and longer than humans. They can also be easily multiplied. As the experiments are conceived and executed automatically by computer, it’s possible to completely capture and digitally curate all aspects of the scientific process, making the science more reproducible. There are now around 100 AI Scientists around the world, working in areas from quantum mechanics to astronomy, from chemistry to medicine.

Within the last year or so the world has been stunned by the success of Large Language Models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT, which have achieved breakthrough performance on a wide range of conversation-based tasks. LLMs are surprisingly strong absorbers of technical knowledge, such as chemical reactions and logical expressions. LLMs, and more broadly Foundation Models, show great potential for super-charging AI Scientists. They can act both as a source of scientific knowledge, since they have read all the scientific literature, and a source of new scientific hypotheses.

One of the current problems with LLMs is their tendency to hallucinate, that is to output statements that are not true. While this is a serious problem in many applications, it is not necessarily so in science, where physical experiments are the arbiters of truth. Hallucinations are hypotheses.

AI has been used as a tool in the research behind tens of thousands of scientific papers. We believe this only a start. We believe that AI has the potential to transform the very process of science.

We believe that by harnessing the power of AI, we can propel humanity toward a future where groundbreaking achievements in science, even achievements worthy of a Nobel Prize, can be fully automated. Such advances could transform science and technology, and provide hope of dealing with the formidable challenges that face humankind in the 21st century

̽��ֱ��Nobel Turing Challenge aims to develop AI Scientists capable of making Nobel-quality scientific discoveries at a level comparable, and possibly superior to the best human scientists by 2050.

As well as being a potential transformative power for good, the application of AI to science has potential for harm. As a step towards preventing this harm, my colleagues and I have prepared the Stockholm Declaration on AI for Science. This commits the signees to the responsible and ethical development of AI for science. A copy of the declaration can be signed on ̽��ֱ��Stockholm Declaration on AI for Science website.

We urge all scientists working with AI to sign.

Professor Ross King from Cambridge's Department of Chemical Engineering and Biotechnology, who originated the idea of a 'Robot Scientist', discusses why he believes that AI-powered scientists could surpass the best human scientists by the middle of the century, but only if artificial intelligence for science is developed responsibly and ethically.

kynny via Getty Images

Robot arm handling test tubes.

̽��ֱ��text in this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. Images, including our videos, are Copyright © ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge and licensors/contributors as identified. All rights reserved. We make our image and video content available in a number of ways – on our main website under its Terms and conditions, and on a range of channels including social media that permit your use and sharing of our content under their respective Terms.

Yes

Cambridge launches Institute for Technology and Humanity

fpjl2 — Tue, 21 Nov 2023 09:13:02 +0000

A major interdisciplinary initiative has been launched that aims to meet the challenges and opportunities of new technologies as they emerge, today and far into the future.

Project launched to provide guidance on research using human stem cell-based embryo models

cjb250 — Fri, 16 Jun 2023 10:00:58 +0000

̽��ֱ��Governance of Stem Cell-Based Embryo Models (G-SCBEM) project is led by Cambridge Reproduction and brings together scientists, legal scholars and bioethics experts, as well as representatives from major funders and regulators of this research.

Stem cell-based embryo models (SCBEMs) are three-dimensional structures that mimic aspects of embryo development. They can be created from embryonic stem cells, which can be persuaded to form structures that share a number of features with the embryonic blastocyst stage – the stage at which, in conception, the embryo begins the process of implanting into the uterus.

SCBEMs may offer insight into these critical stages of early development – stages that are normally inaccessible to researchers. They also offer potential for understanding some of the problems that can affect early pregnancies and lead to miscarriage or birth defects. Given that one in four pregnancies is estimated to end in miscarriage, this research has the potential to transform treatments for recurrent miscarriage and to improve the success rates of IVF and other fertility treatments.

Research using human embryos in the UK is tightly regulated by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, which prohibits scientists from culturing human embryos in the lab beyond 14 days. However, despite the resemblance to human blastocysts (the cluster of cells that forms about five days after an egg is fertilised), SCBEMS are not themselves embryos. They can be derived from embryonic stem cells but can only form in specific conditions within the laboratory. Because of this, they do not fall under the remit of the HFE Act.

Currently there is no dedicated regulatory framework addressing research using SCBEMs, although existing UK law does prohibit them from ever being transferred into a woman’s womb. Nonetheless, the absence of clear, transparent guidance in this area hinders research and risks damaging public confidence.

Cambridge Reproduction, working in partnership with the Progress Educational Trust (PET), aims to break this deadlock by producing a clear and comprehensive recommended governance framework for research using SCBEMs. As this is an emerging area of research, the team is consulting widely to determine the opportunities, areas of consensus and concerns posed by SCBEMs.

̽��ֱ��consultation will also lay the groundwork for engaging the public and other stakeholders in a parallel two-way dialogue around the use of SCBEMs for research and in translation.

“This is a fast-developing area and the project will open important dialogues with researchers, funders, regulators and the general public,” said Professor Kathy Niakan, Chair of Cambridge Reproduction. “We hope that the resulting self-governance framework will enable scientists to proceed with their research with confidence, while maintaining public trust in this vital area of research.”

“Given the similarities that SCBEMs have with human embryos, they offer enormous potential to unlock secrets of early pregnancy,” said Professor Roger Sturmey from Hull York Medical School, Chair of the G-SCBEM Guidelines Working Group. “However, because of these similarities, it is important that scientists working in this field maintain high standards and public confidence and so we hope that a self-governance framework will provide this.”

Sandy Starr, Deputy Director of PET and a member of the G-SCBEM Oversight Group, said, “SCBEMs open up avenues of research that are vitally important for people affected by infertility or genetic conditions. Use of SCBEMs can advance our understanding of human development, disease and reproduction, improving established reproductive technologies while opening up new possibilities. For this research to thrive, it needs to be conducted responsibly and governed in a clear and transparent way, which is where the G-SCBEM project comes in.”

̽��ֱ��G-SCBEM guidance will be launched in the late autumn, and will be regularly reviewed to ensure that it keeps pace with new scientific developments.

̽��ֱ��G-SCBEM project is funded by grants from the BBSRC Impact Acceleration Account and the ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge Impact and Knowledge Exchange fund.

̽��ֱ�� ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge has launched a project to develop the first governance framework for research involving stem cell-based human embryo models in the UK.

We hope that the resulting self-governance framework will enable scientists to proceed with their research with confidence, while maintaining public trust in this vital area of research

Kathy Niakan

Silvia Ferreira (Wellcome Collection)

Human stem cell embedded in a 3D matrix, Cryo SEM

̽��ֱ��text in this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. Images, including our videos, are Copyright © ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge and licensors/contributors as identified. All rights reserved. We make our image and video content available in a number of ways – as here, on our main website under its Terms and conditions, and on a range of channels including social media that permit your use and sharing of our content under their respective Terms.

Yes

Licence type:

Attribution

Should we allow genome editing of human embryos?

cjb250 — Tue, 28 Feb 2023 13:39:24 +0000

A citizens’ jury of individuals whose lives have been affected by hereditary disease has voted in favour of asking the UK government to consider changing the law to allow genome editing of human embryos to treat serious genetic conditions.

Interfering in big decisions friends and family take could violate a crucial moral right, philosopher argues

ta385 — Wed, 25 Jan 2023 07:30:00 +0000

If you’ve told an adult friend or family member that they should not take a job, not date someone, not try skydiving or not move abroad, you may have violated a crucial moral right to ‘revelatory autonomy’ and ‘self-authorship’, according to a philosopher at Christ’s College, Cambridge.

Dr Farbod Akhlaghi’s study, published in the journal Analysis, is the first of its kind to suggest that we have a moral right to ‘revelatory autonomy’, that is the right to discover for ourselves who we’ll become as a result of making ‘transformative choices’, choices to have experiences that teach us what that experience will be like for us whilst also changing our core preferences, values and desires.

Dr Akhlaghi says: “ ̽��ֱ��ability to see that the person we’ve become is the product of decisions that we made for ourselves is very important.

“I’m not telling people what to do. I’m just highlighting part of what is morally at stake in these very common interactions and trying to develop a framework for us to understand them. I hope some may find this helpful, as these will always be difficult moments for all of us.”

Traditionally, philosophers interested in ‘transformative experiences’ have focused on the decision-maker not on the people who are in a position to influence that person’s choices. But Dr Akhlaghi thinks that these neglected interactions present ‘an urgent ethical challenge’:

“There are lots of different reasons why we might seek to intervene – some selfish, others well meaning – but whatever our motivation, we can cause significant harm, including to the people we love most.”

While Akhlaghi accepts that advice can be offered without crossing the moral line, he warns that it is all too easy to slip into various forms of interference, such as forcing, coercing, manipulating or even ‘rationally persuading’ someone away from a transformative choice, in ways that may violate their right to revelatory autonomy.

Akhlaghi says: “Rational persuasion is probably the most common form of interference. Giving, when asked, factual information about a choice that you have knowledge about and the other person does not, can be justified. But while rational persuasion respects someone’s ability to reason, even this form of engagement can involve disrespecting their autonomous self-authorship.

For example, Akhlaghi continues: “Offering reasons, arguments or evidence as if one is in a privileged position with respect to what the other person’s experience would be like for them disrespects their moral right to revelatory autonomy.”

Initially inspired to consider this area of moral philosophy by personal experiences, Dr Akhlaghi examines and rejects a number of other conditions under which it could be argued that trying to prevent someone from making transformative choices is morally justified.

For example

Dissuading someone from becoming a parent because you think parenthood would make their life worse is problematic because becoming a parent is a positive experience for some and not for others, and no one can know that outcome in advance, even if the person doing the dissuading has experienced being a parent themselves.

A different example in the study relates to dissuading someone from making a career change that involves a big pay cut because you think that they would struggle to afford their expensive tastes. This is just as problematic, Akhlaghi says, because:

“We can only know what the future person’s interests are and whether their present interests will be fulfilled after a transformative choice has been made.”

“ ̽��ֱ��person who changes job might manage to afford their expensive tastes and we don’t even know if that future person would still have these tastes. This highlights another problem – whose interests matter morally when trying to justify interfering: those of the present or the future person?”

Is it ever right to interfere?

“It is only permissible to interfere to try to prevent a transformative choice,” Akhlaghi argues “if someone’s right to revelatory autonomy is outweighed by competing moral considerations.”

A would-be killer’s right to revelatory autonomy is, for instance, plausibly outweighed by the wrongness of killing others solely to discover who they would become by doing so. Equally, protecting a friend from gratuitous self-mutilation would plausibly outweigh their right to autonomously discover what it would be like to harm themselves in this way.

Akhlaghi suggests that the more likely it is that a choice will affect someone’s ‘core preferences, identity and values’, the stronger the moral reasons would need to be to justify interfering in their decision. For instance, interfering in someone’s decision to go to university or not, would require far stronger moral reasons than them choosing whether to eat a cheeseburger or not.

Finally, Akhlaghi clarifies that his study concerns voluntary choices to have ‘transformative experiences.’ Some such experiences are instead either the unintended consequences of something we did, or ones we are forced into as, for example, children might be by a divorce. These raise different but related problems he hopes to explore in future work.

Reference

Farbod Akhlaghi, 'Transformative experience and the right to revelatory autonomy', Analysis (2022), DOI: 10.1093/analys/anac084

We have a moral duty to allow others to make ‘transformative choices’ such as changing careers, migrating and having children, a new study argues. This duty can be outweighed by competing moral considerations such as preventing murder but in many cases we should interfere with far greater caution.

̽��ֱ��ability to see that the person we’ve become is the product of decisions that we made for ourselves is very important

Farbod Akhlaghi

Charlesdeluvio on Unsplash

Two people speaking, sat at a table

̽��ֱ��text in this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Images, including our videos, are Copyright © ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge and licensors/contributors as identified. All rights reserved. We make our image and video content available in a number of ways – as here, on our main website under its Terms and conditions, and on a range of channels including social media that permit your use and sharing of our content under their respective Terms.

Yes

Licence type:

Attribution

Healthcare rationing could see unlawful deaths from COVID-19, researchers claim

fpjl2 — Thu, 21 May 2020 10:49:23 +0000

While the initial coronavirus peak is starting to pass – in Europe, at least – without the ventilator shortages many feared, the spectre of a second wave or future outbreak means questions of medical rationing still hold sway.

New research suggests that current ICU protocols and ethical guidelines lack detail, and leave doctors exposed to legal liability if another contagion surge forces them to make painful snap decisions due to insufficient resources.

While the latest analysis focuses on ventilators, ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge researchers say that many of their arguments apply to other potential medical shortages e.g. a lack of properly staffed ICU beds, dialysis machines or related supplies or equipment.

If shortages lead to denial of treatment based on disability – including ‘chronic illness’ – or age, or treatment withdrawal during sedation, it could violate patient rights and cause unlawful death, argue the Cambridge lawyers.

They say that legal liability could extend to the UK Government if it is required to defend failures to purchase more medical supplies or publish ICU rationing guidance, despite knowledge of risks to life posed by the pandemic.

̽��ֱ��study, published in the Journal of Medical Ethics, is based on UK law, but researchers say it is relevant to other European nations.

“We’re definitely not out of the woods,” said Dr Kathy Liddell, Director of the Cambridge Centre for Law, Medicine and Life Sciences. “With lockdown easing, we might well see a second Covid-19 spike in intensive care units, and health services should be prepared legally as well as medically.”

“ ̽��ֱ��law requires more of hospitals, doctors and clinical commissioning groups than is currently set out in the guidelines provided by the British Medical Association, the Intensive Care Society and medical ethicists.”

“ ̽��ֱ��legal rights of patients matter, and they are not being given the attention they deserve,” she said.

Around 2.5% of Covid-19 patients require mechanical ventilation to live while they fight the virus, and a patient can need assisted breathing for up to three weeks.

Early concerns that the virus would see patient demand overwhelm ventilator supply prompted researchers to investigate the legal limits of ventilator allocation.

They found “little concrete guidance” centrally in the UK, and argue that a shortage could see “postcode lotteries” of patient rights to life saving treatment – as decisions are taken at a local level by hospitals and doctors.

“ ̽��ֱ��guidelines we reviewed differed in many ways,” said co-author Dr Jeff Skopek, from Cambridge’s Faculty of Law. “But they generally had the same goal: save as many lives as possible. While this is of course a worthy goal, it can lead to the violation of patients’ rights – rights are not suspended merely because we are in a crisis.”

̽��ֱ��researchers argue that a ventilator cannot be denied on the grounds that a patient has a disability. “Denying treatment because of a disability, which includes chronic illness, violates the Equalities Act 2010. Denying treatment based on age may also do so,” said Liddell.

“In fact, the Equalities Act requires efforts be taken not to disadvantage disabled people. This may mean giving people with disabilities longer assessment periods on ventilation, or actually not de-prioritising them,” she said.

̽��ֱ��analysis points out that if an initial trial of treatment is proposed, it must not be too short. No one should be taken off a ventilator for reallocation purposes until the trial has been long enough to generate reliable evidence for predicting the patient’s outcome.

Any decision to withhold or remove ventilation must involve consultation with the patient or their family. Moreover, withdrawing a ventilator without bringing the patient out of sedation risks unlawful killing.

“Even though returning to consciousness would be deeply distressing, all patients must be given a chance to breathe independently if they have a meaningful chance of surviving until another ventilator is available,” said Liddell.

If some of these scenarios occur during another virus spike, the researchers say doctors could be directly liable under criminal law for charges such as gross negligence manslaughter, criminal battery or willful neglect.

Even the UK Government could be held responsible. As Skopek highlights, the decision taken by government in April 2020 not to provide a national policy on handling ICU shortages – despite recommendations from its Moral and Ethical Advisory group – could result in a violation of its obligations under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

“Without a national policy, the task of drawing up ICU rationing guidelines was left to individual CCGs and hospitals, and many lacked support to ensure their guidelines were legal and ethically sound,” he said.

Added Skopek: “If we end up with another surge in patients that overwhelms our critical care infrastructure, hospitals and doctors may end up acting unlawfully – and worse, patients may end up dying unlawfully.”

Current medical guidelines risk unlawful deaths of patients – with doctors, hospitals, and even the government potentially liable – if a second peak forces hard choices due to shortages of ventilators and other critical care resources.

Hospitals and doctors may end up acting unlawfully – and worse, patients may end up dying unlawfully

Jeff Skopek

Public Health Image Library

Healthcare workers checking each other’s personal protective equipment

Yes

Licence type:

Attribution-Noncommerical

What makes a good excuse? A Cambridge philosopher may have the answer

ehs33 — Sun, 30 Jun 2019 23:01:00 +0000

We’ve all done it, offered an excuse for our poor behaviour or rude reactions to others in the heat of the moment, after a long commute or a tough day with the kids. Excuses are commonplace, an attempt to explain and justify behaviours we aren’t proud of, to escape the consequences of our acts and make our undesirable behaviour more socially acceptable.

̽��ֱ��things we appeal to when making excuses are myriad: tiredness, stress, a looming work deadline, a wailing infant, poverty, a migraine, ignorance. But what do these various excuses have in common that allows us to recognize them all as plausible? Do they differ from the excuses used in criminal law, like duress or coercion? And what does having an excuse get us – does it really exonerate us?

A researcher from Cambridge ̽��ֱ�� has suggested that the answers lie in what they all tell us about our underlying motivation. When excuses are permissible, it’s because they show that while we acted wrongly, our underlying moral intentions were adequate.

Intentions are plans for action. To say that your intention was morally adequate is to say that your plan for action was morally sound. So when you make an excuse, you plead that your plan for action was morally fine – it’s just that something went awry in putting it into practice. Perhaps you tripped, and that’s why you spilled the shopping you were helping to carry. Or you were stressed or exhausted, which meant you couldn’t execute your well-intentioned plan.

This research presents for the first time a unified account of excuses - the Good Intention Account - that argues our everyday excuses work in much the same way as those offered in a courtroom. When lawyers appeal to duress or provocation in defense of their client, they are claiming that the client may have broken the law but had a morally adequate intention: she was just prevented from acting on it because fear or anger led her to lose self-control.

Until now little light has been shed on what unifies the diverse bunch of everyday reasons we offer when making excuses. Dr Paulina Sliwa’s study from the Faculty of Philosophy, suggests a morally adequate intention is the crucial ingredient.

Recent work in psychology suggests that intentions have a distinctive motivational profile, with philosophers and psychologists both arguing that they are key to understanding how we make choices. Dr Sliwa argues that intentions are the key to making sense of our everyday morality.

Dr Sliwa goes on to explain that appealing to excuses has its limits. “Successful excuses can mitigate our blame but they don’t get us off the hook completely. Saying we were tired or stressed doesn’t absolve us from moral responsibility completely, though they do change others’ perceptions of what we owe to make up for it and how the offended party should feel about our wrongdoing.”

This means that when we make excuses we are trying to haggle, to negotiate whether we deserve anger and resentment, or punishment and how much we need to apologise or compensate. This is why it can be so annoying if someone makes spurious excuses – and also probably why we continue to make excuses in the first place.

Dr Sliwa said, “A successful excuse needs to make plausible that your intention really was morally adequate – but something beyond your control prevented you from translating it into action. That’s why considerations like the following often work: I am sorry for forgetting the appointment – I had a terrible migraine / I haven't slept for the last three nights / I was preoccupied with worries about my mother's health; or I'm sorry I broke your vase – I stumbled over the rug. They all indicate an adequate underlying moral motivation that was thwarted by external circumstances.

“Things that will never work are appeals to weakness of will ‘I just couldn't resist’ or ‘it was too tempting’ don't work. Nor do appeals to things that are obviously immoral.

“ ̽��ֱ��same is true of legal excuses: not every appeal to duress, coercion or provocation will be successful – it will depend on the details of the case.

“Philosophy can give us a better understanding of our mundane, everyday moral phenomena. There are a lot more puzzles to think about in relation with excuses: what's the difference between explaining someone's bad behavior and excusing it?”

̽��ֱ��study is published in the ethics journal Philosophy and Public Affairs.

A free version is available at: http://paulinasliwa.weebly.com/uploads/1/9/0/4/19046427/final_submission.pdf

Dr Paulina Sliwa argues that intentions are the key to making sense of our everyday morality.

Duncan C

Yes

Licence type:

Attribution-Noncommerical

Max Planck Cambridge Centre launched

ag236 — Tue, 13 Mar 2018 09:00:00 +0000

Researchers from Germany’s Max Planck Society (MPS) met with ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge counterparts on Tuesday 6 March for the formal launch of the Max Planck Cambridge Centre for Ethics, Economy and Social Change.

̽��ֱ��launch event, held at Cambridge’s Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, was attended by Professor Martin Stratmann, President of the MPS, and by Professor Stephen Toope, Vice-Chancellor of the ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge.

̽��ֱ��new Centre began its operations in July 2017. One of its aims was to deepen researchers’ knowledge of social change by complementing the Cambridge Anthropology Department’s expertise in the anthropology of ethics with research conducted at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religion and Ethnic Diversity, Göttingen, and economic anthropology research conducted at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle.

̽��ֱ��Centre is the latest of the MPS’s international partnerships. It is funded jointly by the ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge (including the Isaac Newton Trust) and the MPS, and has an initial budget of £2 million. ̽��ֱ��funding will allow six postdoctoral fellows will undertake field research at sites around the world. Over the coming four years, public lectures, workshops and larger conferences will be hosted both in Cambridge and the two German locations. It is expected that the Centre will, in the future, expand its activities to offer positions for visiting scholars, and to make the Centre a hub for further initiatives beyond the life-span of the initial projects.

Speaking at the launch event, Professor James Laidlaw, Head of the Department of Social Anthropology and co-director of the new Centre, said:

“This new Max-Cam Centre is the most ambitious and important of a number of initiatives the newly restored Department is embarking upon. It is an attempt… to show that ethical values and practice are just as pervasive in economic life as they are in religion, or the family… Morality is as crucial to explaining when people behave badly as it is to explaining when they behave well; as crucial to understanding how they cope with adversity as it is to understanding the ambitions they pursue. This is especially important when those hopes and ambitions are radically different from our own: when people’s values seem to us to be perverse, shallow, distorted, or plain incomprehensible.”

Fellow co-director Professor Chris Hann, of the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology at Halle, described the new Centre as an opportunity to renew the moral sciences, and expressed his hope that, in the wake of Brexit, the new Centre will demonstrate the value of continued European collaboration in science and society:

“When we prepared the proposal over two years ago, few observers anywhere imagined that citizens of the UK would vote in a referendum to leave the European Union... In this uncertain climate, we would be very happy if the launch of our modest Centre can be a catalyst for further collaboration between the Max Planck Society and this great ̽��ֱ��.“

Addressing this point, Professor Martin Stratmann said: “I am delighted that, in this period of uncertainty caused by Brexit, we have established another highly visible collaboration with top British scientists”.

He added: “Without any doubt, in today’s globalized world, the dynamics between ethics, religion and economy have reached an unprecedented complexity. This makes the research of the new Max Planck Cambridge Centre very relevant for our times. This cooperation brings together the complementary skills of outstanding scientists of the Max Planck Society and the ̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge.”

Bringing the launch event to a close, Professor Stephen Toope remarked: “ ̽��ֱ��more incomprehensible the world about us seems, the more we need to employ our anthropological imagination to appreciate its depth and diversity. This new joint venture with the Max Planck Society helps us do just that.”

Go to the Max Planck – Cambridge Centre for Ethics, Economy and Social Change's website

̽��ֱ��collaborative venture will offer insights into the links between ethics and social change

̽��ֱ��more incomprehensible the world about us seems, the more we need to employ our anthropological imagination to appreciate its depth and diversity. This new joint venture with the Max Planck Society helps us do just that.

Prof Stephen Toope

Martin Stratmann, President of the Max Planck Society, and Professor Stephen J Toope, Vice-Chancellor

Six research projects currently underway at the Max Planck Cambridge Centre for Ethics, Economy and Social Change

Patrice Ladwig is studying the influence of economic modernisation on Buddhist rites of passage in urban Laos By focusing on funerals and ordinations into monastic life, he explores how the ritual and moral economy that connects monasteries and laypeople has been affected by economic growth, and how increasing wealth, but also social inequalities are expressed and negotiated in rituals.
Johannes Lenhard is working towards an anthropology of the international venture capital industry with field research in London, Berlin, New York, San Francisco and Hong Kong. ̽��ֱ��focus of his project will be on the values and ethics behind the investors’ decisions: Why do VCs support certain startups - for instance Uber, AirBnB and Transferwise - and not others? What kind of a (better) future do investors want to create?
Anna-Riikka Kauppinen is studying the emergence of new banks led by Ghanaian capital owners in Accra. With a focus on networks of institutional and personal exchange between banks and Charismatic Pentecostal churches, which have become major focal points of urban life in West Africa, the project will generate novel approaches to the study of African capitalism.
Patrick McKearney is developing a comparative anthropology of cognitive disability through fieldwork on Christian NGOs that support these individuals in situations of economic change and development. He will focus on the strategies these organisations develop as they seek to change the role these individuals play in social life, and the practical consequences their ethical projects have on the lives of some of the most dependent in different social settings.
Samuel Williams will study the social and economic significance of gold in Turkey over recent decades of market-driven development. Working closely with Turkish goldsmiths in Istanbul and London who help intermediate the scrap gold trade through Turkey between Europe and the Middle East, he will investigate the range of families, businesses, and other organisations that draw on this gold and why it is of value to them.
Rachel E. Smith will conduct research in Vanuatu on moral and ritual economies in contexts of social change, particularly in the context of the production of kava (a narcotic beverage) for the domestic and a burgeoning export market. She will focus on how ethical, ritual and spiritual practices and values mediate social and economic change.

̽��ֱ��text in this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. For image use please see separate credits above.

Yes