̽��ֱ�� of Cambridge - Centre for Financial History

Agricultural markets and the Great Depression: lessons from the past

amb206 — Wed, 07 May 2014 07:00:00 +0000

It took an estimated 2.3 billion metric tonnes of grain to feed the world in 2011 – that’s 6,300,000 tonnes per day. These staple foodstuffs, primarily wheat and corn, are traded on global commodities markets, and one sixth of this total is produced in the Midwest of the USA annually. Once harvested, the grain begins an often long journey, stopping first in one of the many elevators (silos) that soar above the Midwestern prairie landscape.

These vast storage facilities house the grain that keeps much of the world supplied with bread, pasta and other basics. In North America many of the tallest elevators are owned by Cargill, one of the world’s biggest private companies. Cargill traces its roots back to a single grain warehouse in 1865, and continues to dominate world markets for commodities such as wheat and cattle. Companies like Cargill are major traders in organised commodity markets in Chicago and elsewhere. On one exchange, the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), 349 billion bushels of corn, 115 billion bushels of wheat and 184 billion bushels of soya beans changed hands in 2010.

̽��ֱ��power of traders on the exchanges to set prices for basic foodstuffs was established by the late 1800s. In a novel called ̽��ֱ��Pit (published in 1903), Frank Norris wrote: “Think of it, the food of hundreds and hundreds of thousands of people just at the mercy of a few men down there on the Board of Trade. They make the price. They say just how much the peasant shall pay for his loaf of bread. If he can’t pay the price, he simply starves.”

Rasheed Saleuddin, a PhD candidate in the Faculty of History, is studying the economic context in which some of the world’s most powerful trading interests emerged. He explained: “My research looks at the interaction between grain trading pioneers and monopolists such as Cargill, clubby self-regulatory agencies such as the Chicago Board of Trade, well-funded academic investigators, and bureaucrats from a newly-interventionist US Federal Government during the rapid development of grain trading markets in Chicago and elsewhere in the US Midwest during the period between the First and Second Word Wars.”

With extensive experience in trading commodities and ‘derivatives’ (securities linked to the performance of commodities) as a hedge fund manager, Saleuddin’s most recent work revisits the ways in which some of the leading economists working in the latter half of the 20th century explained the causes of the Great Depression of the 1930s. By examining the intricacies of the markets for agricultural commodities, such as wheat and corn, he has been able to critique some important evidence for one view of the causes of the Great Depression.

“I’ve been able to apply academic evidence accumulated during the interaction between interest groups such as the newly-formed US regulatory agency, the Grain Futures Administration (1922) and the Stanford Food Research Institute, funded by later US President Herbert Hoover in the same year,” he said.

“An agriculture commodity future is a contract, traded on an organised market called an exchange, whereby a specific quantity of certain subset of grades and quality of a natural raw product (such as wheat or cotton) can be contracted for at a set price in advance of its delivery. For example, a wheat elevator operator storing wheat from the most recent harvest over the winter could enter into a futures contract to sell that wheat for delivery the following May. In May, the operator could deliver the wheat to the other side of the contract, who, crucially but perhaps confusingly, would not necessarily be the original counterparty. More likely, however, both parties would close their contract out before maturity in May, and the elevator operator would make a separate agreement at that time to sell the wheat to a cash buyer.”

̽��ֱ��exchange not only provides a place to do business but also sets the rules of engagement, one of which mandates the settlement of the profit or loss on these contracts at the end of each trading day, others of which allow for transferability and fungibility (whereby every contract is identical to every other contract) of any agreement made on the exchange.

Though of earlier origin, exchanges on which these futures could be traded became well established in the US Midwest and coastal cities by the middle of the 19th century. ̽��ֱ��earliest futures markets in the US traded agricultural products, such as wheat, cotton and maize corn. ̽��ֱ��wheat market was especially important, according to the accepted history: it allowed farmers and middlemen, who held grain stores over the winter when the trade routes were inaccessible, to set a price for their inventories in advance of their sale, reducing the risk to further drops in price.

By the interwar period, traders in these futures markets for goods such as wheat or cotton set the prices transacted between farmers and middlemen or middlemen and end-users (including flour millers) in the much larger “spot” or ”cash” markets of those commodities, where most of these agricultural products were traded for immediate delivery by truck or boatload.

Saleuddin and his academic supervisor D’Maris Coffman are revisiting and reinterpreting the models developed by Stanford agricultural economist and statistician Holbrook Working and his contemporaries during the 1920s and 1930s. “ ̽��ֱ��studies of futures markets carried out in the years between the World Wars could not be replicated in today’s markets due to the increased complexity of modern markets as well as the political difficulties in obtaining compliance from the regulated for the information required,” said Saleuddin.

However, much of the early work done by the USDA, the Federal Trade Commission, Penn, Stanford and others has been ignored by more modern economists, who are less focused on the intellectual history of the study of these markets, and less interested in the context of the data they have been analysing from the period.

When the Great Depression hit North America in late 1929, the consequences were disastrous for the farmers of the Midwest. After record harvests the previous year, and facing oversupply throughout most of the 1920s, demand all of a sudden dried up for most foodstuffs, while Europe imposed quotas and embargoes and Argentina and Australia swamped the markets with their exports. Another record grain crop in 1931 was harvested with little hope for its resale, domestically or as export. ̽��ֱ��price of Chicago wheat fell hard and fast from $1.40 per bushel in July 1929 to 49 cents – a fall in value of about two-thirds in just two years.

Immediately after this, a second disaster hit: what became known as the Dust Bowl was a severe drought across the USA that began in 1933 and severely affected the economic social and political landscape of the US, arguably to this day. Prices doubled from the depths of the original crash, rising above a dollar by mid-1934. By 1937, 21% of rural families were on emergency government relief. Almost one in ten farms changed hands in 1933, half of those voluntarily.This was the America of John Steinbeck and his epic 1939 novel ̽��ֱ��Grapes of Wrath. It was not until the advent of the Second World War, ten years after the initial stock market crash, that economic output in the US recovered its pre-1929 levels.

This devastating period of economic meltdown caused untold hardship to millions in the Western world. Explanations of its causes were hotly debated at the time and have continued as a focus for discussion among economists. ̽��ֱ��monetarists, a highly influential school of what has become orthodox economic thought, claim that the Great Depression could have largely been avoided if the US government had provided more money, usually measured as consisting of currency in circulation and bank deposits, into the financial system.

Saleuddin argues that the problem with this hypothesis is that the cost of money, as measured by the rental value of money, the interest rate, was quite low, indicating anything but a shortage. ̽��ֱ��response of most economists is to focus on the interest rate after adjusting for price changes in the economy, usually called the “real” rate of interest. Thus, the rate shown in the newspapers, usually called the “nominal” rate of interest is related to the real rate as follows: Real rate of interest = Nominal rate - inflation (or + deflation).

If deflation (a fall in the general price level) was expected in 1929-1932, then, even if the nominal rate of interest was near zero, the expected real rate of interest could have been quite high, thus providing evidence of a shortage of money during the early Depression years.

In 1987 and 1992, well-known economist James Hamilton noticed that the future price was almost always higher than the spot price during the early years of the Depression. Hamilton concluded that people expected inflation, not deflation, after the crash of 1929, and, therefore, a shortage of money is unlikely to be the sole cause, if it was a cause at all, of the Great Depression.

Saleuddin, however, suggests that Hamilton failed to understand Holbrook Working’s famous empirical observation, referred to in modern works as the “Working Curve”, that the futures price of wheat is always higher than the current price whenever there is a huge surplus of grain sitting in storage, as there was during the early years of the Great Depression. “That the spot price was below the futures price for most of the early years of the Depression tells us nothing about the expectations of economic agents during this period,” he said.

“Hamilton ignored the microstructure of the futures markets as well as the context of the times, and so reached erroneous conclusions.This has important policy implications today, especially as one the most prominent supporters of a non-monetarist explanation of the Great Depression, Ben Bernanke, until very recently sat in the most important position in the world for determining economic policy as chair of the US Federal Reserve. Additionally, Hamilton’s work was recently cited, for example, by Bank of Japan governor Haruhiko Kuroda in his defence of his current monetary policy. If Friedman and the monetarists were correct about the cause of the Great Depression, monetary policy would be the sole and prime focus of policy makers. If not, the world must turn to other solutions to close the output gap that has been caused by this most recent global financial crisis.”

̽��ֱ��interwar period in the USA was characterised by a globalisation of agricultural commodity markets and severe dislocations, including the return to free markets after the First World War and, of course, the Great Depression of 1929-1939. ̽��ֱ��nature of the most severe crisis in over 100 years as well as an understanding of the politics and economics of contemporary (and arguably current) financial markets can only be understood though a detailed examination of archives relating to this period.

Saleuddin’s research draws on his exploration of a wide range of primary sources – political, business, media, theoretical and empirical – which together will enable him to present a better understanding of markets in general, but especially financial market and US government behaviour during the Great Depression. He said: “In this way, it may just be possible for this history to force a rethink of government policy in the regulation of financial markets as well as management of the economy in general.”

Inset images: Chicago Board of Trade traders, room in old Chicago Board of Trade building, dust bowl in Dallas (all Wikimedia Commons), ̽��ֱ��Grapes of Wrath, John Steinbeck (Flickr Creative Commons).

Seventy five years ago, the publication of John Steinbeck's novel ̽��ֱ��Grapes of Wrath shocked the world with its description of starvation in the midst of plenty. PhD candidate Rasheed Saleuddin is re-evaluating established views of the causes of the Great Depression and argues that there are lessons to be learned today.

Think of it, the food of hundreds and hundreds of thousands of people just at the mercy of a few men down there on the Board of Trade. They make the price. They say just how much the peasant shall pay for his loaf of bread. If he can’t pay the price, he simply starves.

Frank Norris writing in ̽��ֱ��Pit (published 1903)

Wikimedia Commons

Ship loading at the Cargill Elevator

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Austerity Britain: it's déjà vu all over again

amb206 — Wed, 16 Jan 2013 09:46:22 +0000

In May 2010, Britain’s first coalition government since the Second World War announced that its primary objective was to reduce the deficit, then running at 11 per cent as the public sector spent £156 billion more than it raised in taxes. Six weeks later, the Chancellor, George Osborne, increased the spending cuts and tax hikes inherited from the Labour Government to £113 billion over five years, with the largest single adjustment to fall on welfare recipients. ̽��ֱ��Chancellor aimed to balance the budget by 2016, by which time public sector debt would be declining as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). He also plans to reduce the public sector’s share of the economy from 48 per cent to 39.5 per cent.

While Osborne is keen to stress the unique nature of the current crisis, we have been here before – not once but several times. In 1922, a previous Conservative-Liberal coalition cut public spending by 9 per cent, with most of the reduction falling within the first year. In this post-war era, pressure came from the ‘squeezed middle’ as millions of households that had begun paying income tax during the First World War latched on to a Daily Mail campaign to root out ‘waste’ in the public sector. Before the war, the basic rate of income tax was 8 per cent. In 1922 it was still at its wartime high of 30 per cent as the Government built ‘homes for heroes’ and widened education provision. ̽��ֱ��Geddes Committee, appointed by the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, recommended that spending be cut by 10 per cent, a third to come from reduced naval expenditure, with education taking the second largest cut.

These cuts, although watered down by Cabinet, allowed the Chancellor, Sir Robert Horne, to achieve his primary aim of reducing income tax, from 30 per cent to 25 per cent. They also contributed to a miserable decade for the British economy. While America enjoyed the ‘Roaring Twenties’ and a long stock market boom that finally broke with the 1929 Wall Street Crash, Britain endured a General Strike as workers protested against wage cuts, and high unemployment, particularly in ‘Outer Britain’ as the old industries of the industrial revolution (cotton, coal and iron) suffered depressed demand.

With the global depression lowering tax revenue and increasing unemployment after the Wall Street crash, the government was in deficit by 1931. ̽��ֱ��economic orthodoxy of the day meant that the budget simply had to balance if the pound were to remain on the Gold Standard. ̽��ֱ��May Committee, appointed to identify savings, estimated that the shortfall for 1931 would be 5 per cent of public spending, rising to 9 per cent in 1932. ̽��ֱ��Committee decided that the burden of adjustment should fall on the unemployed. While unemployment benefit had not changed since 1928, the cost of living had fallen. ̽��ֱ��Chancellor was advised to cut benefits by 20 per cent, taking them just below 1928 levels in real terms. Once again, education was to be the second major source of savings.

̽��ֱ��minority Labour Government was unable to agree on the cuts and collapsed in August 1931. ̽��ֱ��successor National Government (another Conservative-dominated coalition) introduced an emergency Budget in September which eliminated the deficit, now estimated at 12 per cent of public spending, through a combination of tax increases, spending cuts, and debt rescheduling. ̽��ֱ��largest saving came from unemployment benefit, where a 10 per cent cut was combined with increased insurance contributions. ̽��ֱ��Government also announced public sector wage cuts. These fell particularly onerously on junior naval personnel, who were asked to take a 25 per cent wage cut. When they read about this in the newspapers, part of the British fleet mutinied. As news of the mutiny spread, the pound came under speculative attack, forcing Britain off the Gold Standard. So, while the 1931 cuts failed in their primary objective of keeping the pound on the Gold Standard, coming off gold allowed the authorities to direct their attention to the domestic economy, laying the foundations for the 1930s recovery with looser monetary policy.

̽��ֱ��defining image of the 1930s is the Jarrow March, as unemployed workers walked from the North East to London in protest at their plight. But for those who held on to their jobs, it was a relatively good decade as strong economic growth raised living standards.

̽��ֱ��1930s recovery was sustained by rearmament and spending on the Second World War. After adjusting to a peacetime footing in the late 1940s, Britain enjoyed a long post-war boom, which came to an abrupt end with the 1973 oil shock. While most industrial nations reduced spending to offset the increased cost of oil imports, the British decided to ‘tunnel through’ to North Sea oil production, due to come on stream within five years. This meant higher borrowing. In 1975, the government deficit was over 10 per cent. There was also a balance of payments deficit to finance. With a huge loan from the leading central banks falling due in December 1976, and no foreign currency reserves to repay it, the Government had little alternative but to ask the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance. Having already granted two separate loans to Britain in late 1975, and concerned that public borrowing was ‘crowding out’ private enterprise, the Fund had left the Chancellor, Denis Healey, in no doubt that further assistance would be conditional on his lowering the deficit.

Despite a round of cuts in July 1976, confidence remained low and, with sterling in freefall, Britain announced its eleventh visit to the IMF. After several weeks of tense negotiations, Healey agreed to limit the deficit to £8.7 billion in 1977 and £8.6 billion in 1978 (still more than 10 per cent of public spending), contingent upon the economy growing by 3.5 per cent. This meant a further 3 per cent of cuts, spread over two years and across several departments, with defence and capital expenditure on roads, schools and housing bearing the brunt. In the event, the confidence effect of the IMF’s ‘good housekeeping seal of approval’, combined with the measures already taken, saw the British economy achieve robust growth in 1977 and 1978.

What do these episodes tell us about the situation today? ̽��ֱ��table shows that the current austerity outweighs all previous episodes as a percentage of GDP. Apart from 1922, when spending cuts were used to finance lower taxes, the burden of adjustment falls more heavily on spending than taxation.

	1922	1931	1976	2010
Fiscal consolidation/GDP	3%	4%	1%	6%
Budget deficit	3%	12%	7%	10%
Total public debt/GDP	171%	171%	45%	60%
Debt servicing cost/GDP	9%	9%	4%	2%
Spending cuts/tax rises	3:-1	7:6	2:1	3:1

̽��ֱ��size of the current task most closely resembles that of 1931, when the cuts fell principally on the unemployed. Today, Osborne deploys the same argument: that benefit claimants have done better out of cost-of-living adjustments than the working population. However, the differences are stark. With huge war loans to service in 1922 and 1931, interest payments took up a greater proportion of public spending. By contrast, servicing the debt presents few difficulties today. As the graph shows, the current level of public debt is modest by historical standards. Indeed, with ten-year Government bonds currently paying around 2 per cent, demand for UK debt appears to be outstripping supply. ̽��ֱ��government currently spends 3 per cent of GDP on servicing the debt, versus a historical average of nearly 5 per cent.

UK public debt/GDP since the Industrial Revolution

In 1931 the burden was split almost equally between spending cuts and higher taxes. By contrast, Osborne wants spending cuts to take 77 per cent of the adjustment, citing academic work suggesting that cuts are less damaging to growth than tax rises. This is critical because it is growth that will ultimately decide the outcome. As Samuel Brittan of the Financial Times recently pointed out “if we have a normal economic recovery the red ink will diminish remarkably quickly. It we don’t, it won’t”. Twenty-five years of strong growth after the Second World War reduced public debt from 238 per cent to 50 per cent of GDP. Growth, not cuts, reduced a similar deficit in 1977-78 when the second year of cuts was contingent upon robust economic expansion.

Currently, the auspices are not good. ̽��ֱ��Office for Budget Responsibility now believes that the economy shrank in 2012, after predicting 2.8 per cent growth in June 2010. It has also downgraded its growth estimates to 2015, forcing the Chancellor to postpone balancing the budget until after the next General Election, by which time, on current estimates, public sector debt will be 80 per cent, 20 points higher than when the Coalition Government took office.

Reflecting upon the failure of monetarism in the early 1980s, Nigel Lawson quotes Robert Burns, ‘ ̽��ֱ��best-laid schemes o' mice an' men/Gang aft agley’. By the time he comes to write his memoirs, George Osborne may well share these sentiments.

Duncan Needham worked as a bond trader at JP Morgan and a fund manager at Cairn Capital before coming to Cambridge to take a PhD. His research focuses on UK economic policy from the 1960s to the 1980s.

̽��ֱ��last 100 years have seen several governments introduce austerity measures to try to balance the books. Duncan Needham, a Phd candidate in the Centre for Financial History, compares past and present, concluding that current public spending cuts are inhibiting the growth we need.

̽��ֱ��size of the current task most closely resembles that of 1931, when the cuts fell principally on the unemployed.

Duncan Needham, Centre for Financial History

Timojazz, flickr Creative Commons

̽��ֱ��Jarrow March symbolises austerity in the 1930s

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Unlocking the agricultural economics of the 19th century

amb206 — Wed, 03 Oct 2012 08:30:22 +0000

Two hundred years ago the price of British-grown grain – a commodity vital to the baking of bread and the brewing of beer, two items representing household staples, particularly for the poor and working classes - reached an all-time high.

We know this because, just as today’s media reports on the movements of the stock market, listing prices and trading volumes, so too did newspapers of the late 18^th and early 19^th century report on agricultural markets. Known as the Corn Returns, these reports set out the volume and average price of the main corns (wheat, barley, rye, oats, beans and peas) sold in a given week.

̽��ֱ��inflated price of wheat in Britain in 1812 (50 per cent more than average and twice what it had been a decade before) was mainly the result of Napoleon’s Continental Blockade. In 1806, frustrated by his inability to invade Britain or overcome the formidable Royal Navy, Napoleon Bonaparte issued legislation, known as the Berlin Decree, which forbade France and her allies from trading with the British. To enforce the blockade, the French navy policed the English Channel.

̽��ֱ��Berlin Decree was Napoleon's attempt to starve Britain of vital supplies. By the end of the 18th century, Britain’s imports of foodstuffs outstripped exports by ten-to-one. ̽��ֱ��blockade resulted in a tit-for-tat stand-off in which Britain retaliated by banning imports from France and her allies. What resulted was a trade war, which ended when Napoleon fell in April 1814. In many ways this was characteristic of trade spats ever since – including the so-called Cod War.

̽��ֱ��data on Corn Returns, which were published in ̽��ֱ��London Gazette from 1770 onwards, represent an unparalleled historical resource, which promises to shine a light on the role of agriculture and agricultural markets in the British Industrial Revolution.

Now a project at Cambridge ̽��ֱ��’s Centre for Financial History at Newnham College (http://www.centreforfinancialhistory.org), sponsored by the Institute for New Economic Thinking (http://ineteconomics.org), is under way to digitize the Corn Returns and to make the data available to researchers the world over in the form of ̽��ֱ��Corn Returns Online (http://www.cornreturnsonline.org).

“ ̽��ֱ��Corn Returns Online (1770-1865) begins with the publication of returns in ̽��ֱ��London Gazette, but the practice of reporting returns dates from the reign of James II,” said Dr D'Maris Coffman, who is directing the project. “As early as 1685 the state appointed inspectors to report the market prices of major agricultural commodities in the English maritime districts. ̽��ֱ��purpose was to enforce, and adjust, the custom duties on imported grains and bounties on grain exports.”

Both Crown and Parliament used this market information to direct Treasury policy and to ensure that bounties on the export of corn were paid. Although the bounties themselves made up a small part of the revenue, understanding grain markets was also essential to the administration of excise taxation, which represented about half of the total revenue in the early 18^th century. Of that, the excise on beer and ale formed the largest part, and the brewing industry, in turn, consumed between a quarter and a third of the grain grown in Britain.

From 1770 onwards, inspectors were required to supply weekly quantities and prices for specified coastal and inland market centres - including Newcastle, Bristol and Plymouth as well as London - and eventually covered 290 markets. ̽��ֱ��average weekly prices were published in the London Gazette and after 1820 the published returns also included the quantities traded.

̽��ֱ��Corn Returns played a role in the famous debate between David Ricardo and Thomas Malthus on whether or not Britain should remain protectionist after the end of the Napoleonic Wars. In advancing his argument about the “comparative advantage of nations,” David Ricardo employed a corn-ratio theory (sometimes called a corn model), which was in itself an extension of the analysis that Adam Smith made of corn markets in ̽��ֱ��Wealth of Nations.

According to Dr D’Maris Coffman, the director of the Centre for Financial History, this project has the ability to provide a clear picture of the role the infamous Corn Laws played in either fostering or retarding the growth of British industry.

This question has also been raised by Cambridge’s own Professor Ha-Joon Chang who argues controversially that British industry benefited from protectionist policies for the agricultural sector in the early 19th century. Dr Coffman explained: “Whether or not the data ultimately supports Professor Chang’s conclusions, he is correct that the Corn Laws were not just about protecting the interests of the gentry, but were also about state policy in a much wider sense.”

̽��ֱ��Corn Returns had a wider social role as well. They provided an unbroken time series of the prices of standardised commodities (bushels or quarters) and a basis by which newspaper correspondents and their readers could track movements, estimate their land rents, and speculate in grains. Dr Coffman commented: “It is no exaggeration to say that much of 19^th century political economy rested on contemporaries’ interpretations of this data, which was as ubiquitous for them as stock market prices are for us today.”

̽��ֱ��Corn Returns, which amount to more than 6 million data points, represent the 19^th century equivalent of today’s Big Data – a term used to describe the number-crunching power of computing and information technology to gather and analyse the huge quantity of data generated by market participants and by the modern state.

Dr Coffman said: “Our project is by no means the first attempt to make use of this incredible resource. Dr Lucy Adrian, an emerita fellow in Geography at Newnham College, Cambridge, attempted something similar in the 1970s, but the computing resources were not there. My team consists of a statistician, Dr Louise Pryor, and a trade economist, Dr Yuning Gao. I’m delighted we’ve been able to advance Lucy’s work and we hope to take it to completion.”

Modern computers give Cambridge researchers the tools they need to analyse the Corn Returns. ̽��ֱ��data they extract will answer important questions about the nature of agricultural markets in Britain, the world’s first industrialising economy. ̽��ֱ��Corn Laws were a hotly debated topic for 20 years; one side argued they were essential to protecting British agriculture while the other argued that they represented an unjustified tax on manufacturers. “Data extracted from the Corn Returns, and analysed using modern econometrics, will tell us which side was right,” said Dr Coffman.

̽��ֱ��world needs food – and its need for food is ever-expanding. Many of the issues debated, and the economic scenarios played out, in the mid-19^th century have parallels today as developing countries enter global markets with agricultural products vulnerable to the trio of climate change, governmental policy, and speculation.

“At the Centre for Financial History, we are pleased and proud to offer an historical database that will allow us to understand these challenges for the 19^th century, hopefully with lessons for today,” Dr Coffman said.

̽��ֱ��Corn Returns – market data from the 19th century and beyond – represent a valuable resource for economic historians looking at the emergence of modern agricultural markets. A project to make these records digitally available will help solve some of the big questions about the economics of the age.

Much of 19th century political economy rested on contemporaries’ interpretations of this data, which was as ubiquitous for them as stock market prices are for us today.

Dr D'Maris Coffman

Michael Parker Wright (Flickr Creative Commons)

Crops Growing

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